The search for peace and security : the case of Botswana by Gaborone, Mabe Rabashwa
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1994-06
The search for peace and security : the case of Botswana
Gaborone, Mabe Rabashwa




NAVAL POSfGRADUA1E SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
THESIS 
THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND SECURITY: 
THE CASE OF BOTSWANA 
by 
Mabe Rabashwa Gaborone 
June. 1994 
Thesis Advisor: Thomas Bruneau 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY 
NAVN.. POSTGRADUATE SCHOOl 
MONTEREY CA 93943-5101 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704 
I'IIbbo "-""II_f..,dll.colloot .. oIl11fonaolioa.l. __ IO ........ I_pcr-. "",lo4iDglbo ... rcr .... iowiqinsllw:uoa._ .. 
... .,.",d __ pbonq ...... _I .. dMa-."""_ ........ """ .... iow"" ... ~of..r..na-.S....t_ ........... tis 
_._lICorOl\Y_MpCCIoIlhD_ofiBf __ .... hooIint ... _fGt........"Ibi._.IOW-S-~s..mr.e.. 
Dinc_torhlfonaoti ... {lpIroIioaI .... Ropms.I21SJ.-O"aHiah ... Y,SuiIlII2O(. ............ , VA222Q1..43D2, .... ""lbcOflicoofM __ 
.... lIuofaet,Popo"'"""' __ ""'jott(0'104-0188)W~DC205OJ. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (J.eQu bltW:J ]2. REPORT DATE 13. REPORT TYPE AND DAms COVERED 
I lune 1994. Master's Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUB1T!1.E "'TIlE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND S. FUNDING NUMBERS 
SECURITY: lHE CASE OF BOTSWANA 
6. AUTHOR(S) Mabe Rabashwa Gaborone 
7. PERFORMING ORGANlZAnON NAME(S) AND ADDRBSS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Mooterey CA 93943-5000 





AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
It. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of !he author and do not reflect 
the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government 
12 .. DISTRIBU110N/AVAILABILITY STA'rnMENT Ilb. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
Approved for public rcleasc; distribution is unlimited. 'A 
13. ABSTRACT (mtailmom 200 woovU-, 
After Botswana became independent in 1966, the government did not have any immediate plans to 
establish a pennanent anny because of the opportunity cost associated with defense spending then. 
However. external factors such as the nationaIist movements in the neighboring countries proved a threat 
to the sovereignty and integrity of Botswana. hence the need to establish a national anny. Throughout the 
post-independence era, Botswana witnessed a wide range of security problems originating from outside 
her borders. Given her weak eCQllomic posture and priorities for providing social amenities in the years 
following independence. Botswana has attempted largely Ihrougb diplomatic ties, membership in regional 
and international organizations and to a lesser extent military capabilities, to maximize her security and 
influence in an W1Stable southem African subcontinent. 
With the changing global environment after the end of the Cold War, South Africa's transition and 
other regional pressures, Botswana faces a new and different situation under which to address her security 
concerns. Past experience shows that Botswana could not embark. upoo unilateral action for her survival. 
In the altered environment described above, it seems the incentives for nwltilateral approaches an: 
increasingfurBotswana. 
14. SUBJEcr TERMS Peace and security, security management. regionalism. policy 15. NUMBER OF 
implications, post...apartheid and defense roles and missions. PAGES 133 
17. SECURITY CLASSIFl- 118< SBCUIUTY CLASSIFI- 119. SBCUIUTY CLASSIFI- 20. UMlTATION OF 
CATION OF REPORT CAnON OF nus PAGE CATION OF ABSTRAcr ABSTRAcr 
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassifled UL 
Praonto:l~ANSIStd.239-18 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
The Search for Peace and Security: The Case of Botswana 
By 
Mabe Rabashwa paborone 
1st Lieutenant, Botswana Defence Force 
B.A •• University of Botswana. 1987 
Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 





NAVAL POSTGRADUATE < "HOOL 
June 1994 
Thomas Bruneau 
Department of National Security Affairs 
ii 
ABSTRACT 
After Bot~wana became ind"pendent in I %6, the government did 
not have any immediate plam to e~tahli~h a permanent amly becau~e of the 
opportunity CO\ts as~ociated with defen~e ~pcnding. However. external factor~ ~uch 
a~ the nationalist movement~ in the neighboring countric~ proved a threat to the 
~overeignty and integrity of Botswana. hence the need to establhh a national army 
Throughout the po~t-independence era, Botsw,ma witne~sed a \vide range of 
~ecurity prohl~ms originating trom outSide her borders. Given her weak economic 
Jl(\~ture and priorities for providing social amenities in the year~ following 
independence, Botswana ha':> attempted largely through diplomatic tie~, membership 
in regional and Illtemational organizations and to a lesser extent military 
capabilltJe~. to maXimize her ~ecurity and Illtluence III an uns!:.:,ble southern African 
~ubCo[)li[)ent. 
With the changing global environment aftcr the end of the Cold 
War, South Africa'~ tramition and other regional pre~sure~, Bol\wana face\ a new 
and different -;ituation under which to address her ~ecllfity concem~ Pa~t 
experience ~ho\Vs that Botw,.ana could not embark upon unilateral action ror heor 
~ur\'ival. In the altered environment dc~crined above, it seems the incentive~ for 
multilateral appTOachc~ art: lllCTea~lIlg for Botswana 
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I _ INTRODUCTION 
The search for peace and security in Botswana offers a 
good example of a relatively weak country (militarily) trying 
to preserve its autonomous status against stronger neighbors. 
Historically, the use of military means to resolve conflicts 
has not been in the nature of Batswana. This goes to explain 
partly why Botswana has been one of the late entrants in 
establishing permanent national armies. The use of the 
military in Botswana has been largely confined to providing 
latent capabilities more than being an instrument of attaining 
targets beyond the country's borders. on the other hand, the 
pressure for providing basic social amenities immediately 
after independence precluded Botswana from establishing a 
permanent national army. Against this background, the thesis 
shall examine the events leading to the evolution of armed 
forces in Botswana, as part of a complex process of security 
management. 
In a similar vein, the impact of the Cold War in southern 
Africa had a significant role in determining the nature and 
patterns of security management in Botswana. This was a period 
in which the involvement of superpowers dramatically 
influenced regional security affairs. There were spill-over 
benefits and setbacks emanating from the superpower rivalry. 
For example, security assistance programs were extended to 
various regional states during times of need, while at the 
same time the superpowers would support the interests of 
minority parties. The demise of the Cold War, therefore, means 
a changing environment in which the involvement of the 
superpowers in regional affairs becomes limited and 
questionable. One of the resultant scenarios is that an 
obligation is being created among the regional actors to 
address security in accordance with the altered environment. 
See Figure 1. 
Equally important are the changes likely to occur as 
result of South Africa's move to democracy. Among Botswana's 
neighbors. South Africa has been the most influential country 
in so far as the nature of security policy choices were 
concerned. In this regard, the thesis will explore the 
possible scenarios likely to result from the South African 
transition to democracy and their impact on Botswana's 
security. 
Debates relating to security with respect to Botswana 
reveal one interesting feature; namely, the fact that the 
present and foreseeable financial and military capabilities of 
the country preclude it from resorting to fully-fledged 
conventional means of security management. Even in the post-
apartheid era. there remains serious doubts as to whether the 
military efforts of Botswana and other regional states 
combined can parallel those of South Africa. The possibility 
is that South Africa will only cautiously embark upon force 
· .... ' . ... 
Figure 1. Botswana. 
Source: National Development Plan 7 1991-1997 
reduction levels. South Africa is yet to determine her 
national interests and it seems there are potential 
difficulties associated with a change to a pluralistic society 
after decades of apartheid rule. To this end, even if South 
Africa defines her national interests in such a way that she 
gives cognizance to the interests of her neighbors, the early 
stages of transition will continue to pose questions to her 
neighbors. 
There are difficulties inherent in diluting the military 
might of South Africa. Her neighbors have the ultimate 
obligation of narrowing the gap between themselves and South 
Africa while at the same time finding ways to ensure that a 
peaceful co-existence prevails. The questionable fate of small 
countries like Botswana remains intriguing for policymakers. 
The nature of dilemmas already evident and those likely to 
erupt in the new environment make military means of resolving 
conflict less feasible for Botswana. Against this background, 
the thesis shall finally explore the viability of regionalism 
as one of the possible security management prescriptions in 
the changing securi ty context of Botswana. 
II. APPROACH AND RESEAllCB QUBSTIOH 
This thesis examines alternative approaches in the search 
for peace and security in Botswana, addressing security 
management as an evolving process. To understand the various 
measures influencing the security process, the ovezview of 
Botswana covers the difficulties which arose as a result of 
the open-door policy and further examines the implications of 
the country's geo-strategic location. Since much literature 
treats issues relating to the security of Botswana 
inferentially, the fourth chapter specifically covers the 
impact of the Rhodesian struggle on Botswana's security. The 
establishment of a permanent national army in Botswana was 
largely a function Of the persistent clashes between the 
Rhodesian forces and the Rhodesian liberation movements. The 
chapter looks into the refugee factor as a spill-over problem 
from Rhodesia and the assistance extended to Botswana by the 
United Nations in recognition of the threat posed to her 
sovereignty. The final phase of this chapter offers a brief 
summary of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) since formation. 
The fifth chapter addresses the role played by South 
Africa on Botswana's security mainly by examining the economic 
dependency and its inherent problems, political rivalry and 
military relations. These aspects shall be discussed 
simultaneously with the options chosen and implemented by 
Botswana to alleviate the persistent pressure from the 
aggressive South Africa. In all these relations, Botswana was 
attempting to maximize her security given her fragi l ity 
against the preponderance of South Africa . 
The sixth chapter focuses on the impact of the Cold War. 
The primary question to be addressed is : the historical 
relations between Botswana and the two superpowers , with 
particular emphasis on the United States . The Reagan era 
(1980-88) has been the bone of contention in Southern African 
security tal ks because of the ~friendly" relations between the 
u.S and the Pretoria regime which were seen by regional states 
as well intended moves to strengthen South Africa as the 
significant anti-communist force at the expense of regional 
peace and stabi l ity . However, the strengthening of South 
Africa by the u. S . diverted international scrutiny from South 
Afr i ca's controversial domestic policies , a scenario which was 
exploited by South Africa in pursuing her regional agenda of 
destabi l isation in order to consolidate apartheid. 
Because of the fear of the spread of communism on the one 
hand, and opposition to apartheid on the other , U.S. policy 
wavered between the support for the Pretoria regime and 
regional states when circumstances dictated . However, with the 
end of the Col d War, the U.S . policy towards Southern Africa 
has been altered fundamenta l ly, a major shift from forward 
presence (during thi s per i od, the U.S. involvement in the 
region was at its highest peak mainl y because of the strategic 
interests) to a policy more focussed on domestic concerns. 
currently, the strategic significance of the region remains 
questionable with South Africa's transition to democracy. On 
the basis of these changes, especially the apparent need to 
redefine U.S. strategic and corporate interests towards 
southern, Africa there is a lively possibility of Botswana 
facing the difficulties of adapting to a new environment. 
As a proposed solution to the dilemmas of the new 
environment, Chapter VII discusses Botswana' s (as a microcosm) 
use of a regional approach to security. Possibilities of 
embarking upon unilateral action have never been feasible in 
the entire history of Botswana's security management. The 
thesis further addres~~' - '3 the challenges confronting the 
regional organization and its possible transformation in the 
event that concerted regional efforts call for its utility as 
a security management platform in addition to its primary role 
of reducing economic dependency on South Africa. The current 
debates by some political scientists are inclined more to the 
conviction that regional arrangements cannot fill the security 
vacuum created by the end of the Cold War. Thus, the need 
arises for an intensive search for alternative measures and 
exceptional circumstances under which these organizations can 
work. A discussion of the aspects of cohesion available to the 
regional organization in the face of the future challenges 
will be presented in this chapter. 
On the basis of the discussion about regionalism, Chapter 
VIII discusses the future implications for security policy in 
Botswana. Another crucial dimension of this chapter is the 
nature of security policy in Botswana assessed against the 
background of South Africa's transition to democracy. The 
transition to democracy does not alter the historically 
sensitive geo-strat.egic position of Botswana in relation to 
South Africa. only the government has changed, but other 
delicate variables like the economic hegemony, unparalleled 
military might and dependency factors remain constant.. In 
brief, whatever happens within the borders of South Africa as 
she faces the real challenges of building a truly unit.ed 
nation will cont.inue to have spill-over effects on Botswana 
and the ent.ire region. On the basis of this trend, the thesis 
finally examines the policy implications for Botswana's 
security now that the first phase of the long-awaited majority 
rule in South Africa has been achieved. 
III. OVERVIEW ON BOTSWANA 
Over the past two and half decades. the search for peace 
and security in post-independent Botswana presented serious 
challenges for the newly born country. Emerging from eight 
decades of British colonial rule in 1966, the underdeveloped 
country proved to be less capable of responding satisfactorily 
to military threats posed by its stronger neighbors such as 
South Africa and Rhodesia. This was largely due to the fact 
that during the entire colonial period, the British did not 
make any significant infrastructural developments in the then 
Bechuanaland Protectorate because of the perceived absence of 
any strategic value of the country. 
The British government declared Botswana a protectorate in 
1885 after Batswana had appealed for assistance from Britain 
as a security safeguard against the possible Afrikaner 
attempts to incorporate their country into the Union of South 
Africa. Britain mainly acceded to this request in order to 
prevent the joining together of the South Africa and the 
German South West Africa, thus keeping open her access to 
Central Africa where her interests lay. and to secure law and 
order in areas adjacent to the diamond mines of the Cape 
colany.l 
Because of the seemingly insignificant economic posture of 
the Tswana country to inunediate British imperial interests, 
the transfer of the reins of power from the colonial masters 
to the local people in 1966 was a relatively simple and 
peaceful process in which negotiations were pivotal. The 
absence of any economic significance traceable t.o Bot.swana by 
the British at this time goes to explain why they treated 
matters relating to defence in the protectorat.e with less 
importance. The only source of security for t.he protectorate 
was a paramilitary force known as the Bechuanaland Border 
Police (BBP) , responsible for a wide range of administrative 
duties and involvement in boundary and border issues ( Morton 
et. aI, 1989, p97). With the changing nature of the 
protectorate administration, the BBP was gradually transformed 
to meet the expectations of the colonial administration. A few 
years before the country became independent, the paramilitary 
forces changed the name to Police Mobile Unit (PMU). charged 
with t.he specific responsibility of patrolling borders which 
were increasingly being crossed by masses fleeing from the 
internal conflicts of independence-seeking neighbors. For 
eleven years aft.er independence, the PMU remained the sale 
1. For further details regarding the events leading to 
the creation and proclamation of the Protectorate and the 
strategic import.ance of Botswana to British colonial 
interests, see Mort.on et al.. (1989, pp. 97-89) and Tlou & 
campbell (1984, pp. 142-153). 
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source of military security for Botswana. 
Upon attaining her independence, Botswana came to be 
preoccupied with the immediate need for developing a self-
reliant economy. However, the process of building an economy 
capable of maintaining its people was a long and arduous one 
only partially eased by the discovery and exploitation of 
minerals, economic and technical assistance from the West, 
far-sighted local planning and African solidarity (Carter & 
Margan, 1980, pxxiiil. These measures took a lang time to bear 
fruit, thus precluding Botswana from addressing other societal 
needs. One such sector which suffered as a result of the 
preoccupation with the economy was military security. 
Establishing a military capable of satisfying the country's 
future security challenges was seen as a measure to be 
deferred in favor of the economic and other domestic 
developments such as providing basic education. At this time, 
the need for a permanent national army was not as pressing as 
it turned out later with the growing national sentiments in 
the neighboring countries. 
A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GEO-STRATEGIC POSITION 
Located right at the center of Southern Africa, Botswana's 
security has always derived its flavor and direction from the 
regional and external factors. ow1ng to the relative degree of 
peace prevailing internally and a stable political culture, 
domestic factors did not have a dramatic influence in the 
search for peace and security as much as the external ones. 
Foreign policy administration in Botswana draws heavily from 
the regional geo-politics which for a long time have not been 
favorable to the country's internal developments. See Figure 
2. 
Fi~re 2. Botswana in Southern Africa. 
The weak economic and defence posture of Botswana during 
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the two and half decades played a significant role in the 
search for peace and security. The single most important 
di l e:nma has been the desire to balance her internal needs, 
such as the protection and maintenance of railway links while 
simult.aneously embarking upon a prudent and swift policy aimed 
at opposing minority rule. The dependency of Botswana on her 
neighbors for survival , mainly economically, dictates that 
foreign po l icy be conducted cautiously so as to avoid 
circumstances which would " legitimize" punitive action by her 
st!:"onger neighbors . What one sees in Botswana is a militarily 
weak country geared towards maximizing its "security returns" 
and influence in a region where it is dwarfed by its immediate 
and stronger neighbors. 
As a landlocked country with a fragile economy, Botswana 
depends on the economic cooperation of its neighbors. In 
looking at her neighbors, Botswana readily distinguishes 
between pol i cy choices likely to jeopardize her long-cherished 
principle of good neighborliness and security on the one hand, 
and those which can offer adequate flexibility in dealing with 
domestic and foreign policy matters on the other hand . A 
seeming l y insignificant miscalculation in foreign policy 
administration is enough to plunge the country into an 
unending quagmire wi th far- reaching consequences. 
B. OPEN-DOOR POLICY 
One of the most important policy commitments ever 
introduced by Botswana under the Presidency of the late Sir 
Seretse Khama (1966-1980) was to offer political asylum to 
those fleeing from oppressive regimes in the trouble-torn 
neighboring countries. According to the open-door policy, the 
Government of Botswana committed itself to providing asylum to 
refugees as a contribution to the burden of liberation (Carter 
& Morgan, 1980, pxix). Pursuant to the humanitarian principles 
of both the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United 
Nations (UN), Botswana believed that denying oppressed people 
asylum within her borders amounted to a serious disregard for 
human rights. 
This policy was tailored such that it could serve as a 
legal and internationally- recognized framework for assisting 
victims of political persecution seeking asylum in Botswana. 
Such victims could not, however, use Botswana to attack 
regimes in their respective countries. While in Botswana, 
their status was to remain strictly within the confines of the 
behavior of internationally recognized political refugees who 
had temporarily suspended their political activities since 
they were in a foreign land. Deliberate moves to avail her 
soils to be used against her stronger neighbors would have 
legitimized military intervention by the Rhodesian and South 
African forces. 
The policy was clearly a longterm consideration on the 
part of Botswana's security equation in which the policymakers 
he l d the strong conviction that for peace and stability to 
prevail in their country, the entire region has to be 
peaceful. But the pol icy also required a sacrifice because, in 
the shortrun, it became a recipe for enduring conf l ict between 
Botswana and her neighbors because it ran count er to their 
dome stic policies. At the continental and international 
l evels, Botswana gained recognition and respect for taking a 
bold step despite i t s inherent dangers. 
An addit ional intriguing aspect of this policy was the 
fact that Botswana risked the displeasure of oppressed friends 
by refusing to a l low them to carry out clandestine operat ions 
against the i !:" adversaries using her soil as the springboard 
(Anderson, 1979, pxviii). This dilemma was further deepened by 
the fact that the very desperate part i es saw Botswana as their 
sale source of security because of their common interests and 
the relative degree of peace and stabil i ty prevailing in the 
country at the time. At the other end of the spectrum, t he 
minority leaders in South Africa and Rhodesia believed that 
this po l icy was an open official pronouncement in which 
Botswana explicitly avail e d her soils for guerilla activities 
against them, especial ly Rhodesia. 2 Historically, it was 
2. Th is was a faulty interpretation aimed at providing 
the i llegitimate regimes with a pretext to v i olate Botswana's 
t e rritorial integrity perpetually, purporting to be in search 
of guerillas believed to operating from Botswana. ~
15 
these conflicting interpretations on the part of liberation 
movements and the aggressive regimes and their underlying 
problems, coupled with the uncompromising stance taken by 
Botswana with respect to the policy which saw the country 
being drawn hastily into the difficulties of building a 
national anny under duress. 
Yearbook: 1977, (1980, pp. 217-219). 
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IV. BOTSWANA AND THE RHODESIAN STRUGGLE (1972 ·79) 
The struggle for independence against the Smith regime in 
Rhodesia dating as far back as the :1960s was one of the most 
influential factors in Botswana's endless search for peace and 
security. One notable outcome of the prolonged confrontation 
between the liberation movements and the Rhodesian f orces was 
the degree to which the struggle came to have direct and 
immediate implications for BotsW;';';la's security and policy 
choices, resulting in the establishment of a permanent 
national army. With the mounting pressure for independence and 
the guerilla activities characterizing the struggle at the 
time, Botswana suffered mainly because of her proximity to 
Rhodesia and her longterm goal of working towards promoting 
maj ority :::-ule in the neighboring countries. 
BACKGROUND TO THE RHODESIAN STRUGGLE 
The Rhodesian civil war was an e volving process which can 
be partial l y understood in the context of reg ional and 
international politics. However, it is not i n the scope of 
this thesis to discuss such trends and their impact in an 
exhaustive manner. The crucial period essential towards 
understanding the impact of the struggle on Botswana's search 
[or peace and security was between :19 72-79. During this 
period, four prominent factors in the Rhodesian political 
landscape converged to hasten the move towards independence. 
with serious and far-reaching implications for Botswana' s 
security: ~) the active role played by the Zimbabwe National 
Liberation Army (ZANLA) in waging the bulk of fighting in the 
liberation war, 2) the improvement of Zimbabwe African 
Nationalist Union's (ZANU) tactics of the guerrillas in 1972 
and its ability to attract significant African civilian 
support within Rhodesia, 3) the installation in september 1974 
of a Frelimo-dominated Government in Mozambique, providing 
their ZANU allies with an opportunity to operate along the 
lengthy eastern and south~eastern borders of the country and 
to make successful attacks on communications in many different 
parts of the country, and, 4) the creation of the Patriotic 
Front (PF) I an uneasy but powerful alliance formed in October 
1976 between Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU) and Robert Mugabe (ZANU).3 
The aggregate internal effect of these changes was the 
uneasy mood and mounting tension against the Smith regime 
which had to do everything in its capacity to tighten its grip 
on the reins of power. The difficulty of dealing with the 
liberation movements led to a situation in which the very 
regime looked beyond its borders for scapegoats. In order to 
maintain the statlls guo, the regime had declared all 
3. For an elaborate discussion of the events leading to 
the transition to independence in Rhodesia and the role played 
by international mediators, see Africa Contemporary 
Record(1989) . 
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opposition parties illegal, hence their covert operations from 
the jungle. It was this clandestine nature of the struggle 
w~ic~ deepened dilemmas for the regime with further ripples 
being sent across its borders. Covert operations accorded the 
l iberation movements an advantage of waging war against the 
Rhodesian goverl'.ment without being detected easily. In 
accordance wi':h the Sun Tzu notion of war, one of the 
essen<;::ial elements necessary for military decision-making and 
planr.ing processes during wartime, namely, adequate knowledge 
about the weaknesses and capabilities of the enemy forces, was 
lacking in the top echelon of the Smith government. 4 
Additionally, the covert nature of the confrontation 
compensated for the inferior weaponry and other logistic 
limitations facing freedom fighters against their stronger 
adve:!:"saries. 
Where it became clear and evident that the regime CQuld 
not use its intelligence effectively to curtail the activities 
of the liberation movements, political persecution remained 
the only v i able options. Africans within Rhodesia became 
vict ims of the perpetual searches on the pretext that, as 
fellow Africans they were au tomatically opposed to white-led 
government, and therefore, lent support to the struggle 
4. Sun Tzu has contributed remarkably towards the 
understanding and operations in strategic warfare. He has been 
noted for making observations with a continuous relevance. 
Most scholars of strategic warfare continue to draw heavily 
from his theories. For an elaborate d iscussion of his 
theories, see (Griffith, ~963). 
against the regime. From the regime's point of view, the most 
effective strategy was one of inflicting fear into the hearts 
of the oppressed so as to discourage the general population 
from engaging in any practices threatening the ~. The 
strong and fa r- reaching implication was the preparedness on 
the part of the regime to export terrorism beyond the 
Rhodesian borders when circumstances warranted such action. 
The most serious shortcoming traceable to the Smi th government 
was its perpetual rigidity and failure to acknowledge the 
financial burden it incurred as a result of the difficulties 
of counter - i nsurgency. Similarly, "Ian Smith refused to reckon 
with the fact that the freedom fighters were operat i ng from 
within Zimbabwe itself and not from Botswana or any other 
neighboring ~ate " (U.N. Yearbook, 1977, p .217). 
With all these factors, Rhodesia became the arena of 
intense military activity . The regime introduced curfew 
regulations in all African settlements and considerably 
increased the share of the national budget allocated to the 
military. As part its strategy which saw the confrontation 
strongly in racial terms, the relat i ons between the 
neighboring African states and the Rhodesian government soured 
as the terrorism was being extended beyond the Rhodesian 
borders into these countries. Their moral support for 
liberation movements brought them i nto direct conflict with 
the Smi th regime. The regime was sensitive to moves taken by 
its neighbors with respect to the Rhodesian question and 
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lnte~reted most of them as provocative and a deliberate 
inter-rent ion in its domestic affairs. 
To many African leaders at the time, the revolution in 
Rhodesia was a:1 inevitable measure in the debates relating to 
regloual peace and prosperity. While this perception was a 
cammal: concerr. and usually backed by s':rategic reasoning, it 
-..lsually left the desperate vic':ims of Oppression deeply 
perplexed when their neigl'..bors and allies iecl~ned to provide 
any exp=-lcj t watercal assistance because of the dangers 
luhereut in such moves. During the period III question, African 
Ilbera::lon movements were in dire need of bases outside 
Rhodesia WhlCh could er.able them to reorganize and launch 
attacks against the regime. 
Despi te the officia: positions taken by some nelghboring 
cour.tries : ike Botswana (the o-:ficial position articulated 
::hrO"..lgr. the open-door policy) regaYd~ng the Rhodesian 
struggle, the Smith regime held an opposlte view. Its 
convic.tion was tr.at the pro-najority rule African governments 
were i:1 no uncertain terms going to a:ct in its (the regime) 
veSL lnterest where matters pertaining to the wel::are of 
fellow Airlcans were concerned. This insecurity on the part of 
the reg~me was concre-.;;ized by an open regional political 
support for liberation movements during this period. 
would yield only after a furthe=, 
ne'qncenwq of tr.e guerilla warfare. 5 
It was tais longter.n conviction coupled with the di::"emrnas of 
the open·door policy and the proximity factor which saw 
Botswana being drawn hastily into a direct and prolonged 
confrontation with the Smith government during the 19708. At 
a strategir. IGv~l, cQmprom~sing the commitment towards a 
revolution ~n Zir.1.babwe had the potential danger of e:xpos~ng 
Botswana to the possibility of the spread of racialism into 
her borders and postponing the process of working towards a 
region in which stability prevails. In totality, Botswana 
welcomed the short run burd~ns of cush~oning the side-effects 
of the revolution, mainly because of the perceived ::"ongterm 
benefits. 
B. THREATS POSED TO BOTSWANA'S SOVEREIGNTY 
The co:nplexities surrounding the Rhodesian s'.:ruggle 
gradual Ly IT.an~fested themselves i:).to regional problems more 
than domest:ic ones. For the first time in the post-independent 
Botswana, excernal threats came to be the primary conce:::-n in 
parliamentary deba'.:es. With the narrowir~g options fo:::- the 
Rhodes1.a:r. Gove:::-nment in deal~ng with its domest~c proble!11s, 
Eotswdna oecarr,e one of its first victims. The strategic 
[osition of Botswana, its weak defence posture and its open 
door policy, combined to create relations with Rhodesia that 
5. See Africa SouLh...,gLthe Sdha..ra, (1992, p.:126). 
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required the establishment of a permanent national army. The 
Smith government deliberately seized the opportunity to enter 
Botswana illegally under pretext that it was pursuing 
freedom fighters operating r:rom their ftguerilla bases" inside 
the country. Such fallacious reasoning remained the most 
"persuasive" argument behind frequent border violations. 
However, the habit of violating Botswana's territorial 
integrity was not a new phenomenon, it dated as far back as 
the ~960s. The difference between pre-independence and post-
independence circumstances lies in the magnitude of the 
internal struggle in Rhodesia and Botswana's changing policy 
commitments towards her own security and regional concerns 
after independence. 
With the heightening unpopularity of the Smith regime, 
refugees fleeing from its persecution saw Botswana as their 
only salvation. The regime sent its forces into Botswana, 
purportedly pursuing guerrillas and not refugees. The regime 
was not prepared to verify whether Botswana kept legitimate 
refugees or freedom fighters within her borders. Instead the 
ultimate goal was to discourage her from embarking upon her 
open-door policy, thus enabling the regime to curtail the 
movements of its opponents without the difficulties of 
operating beyond its borders. Because of the repeated border 
violations by the Rhodesian forces, in 1976 Botswana 
complained to the U.N. that the Smith regime had declared the 
entire 400 mile border between Botswana and Southern Rhodesia 
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a war zone (U.N. Yearbook, 1977, p.216). It had become a 
cornman scene for locals residing closer to the north-eastern 
border to witness infiltration of Rhodesian forces into 
Botswana. Such moves often reached a crescendo by cross border 
shootings between Botswana's Police Mobile Unit (PMO) and the 
intruders. Local people could not carry out their farming 
activities as much as they used to do. The normal operations 
of the Rhodesian forces were characterized by loss of lives 
and perpetual pressure on the locals believed to be 
collaborating with the freedom fighters. Since Botswana's 
accession to independence in 1966, Rhodesian forces were 
reported to have crossed into Botswana on 36 different 
occasions (U.N. Yearbook, 1977, p.216). 
c. THE REFD'GEE QUESTION 
The increasing numbers of the refugees coming into 
Botswana became a primary concern for the Government mainly 
because they were a threat economically, politically and. in 
terms of broad security considerations. However, the 
commitment to the open-door policy remained unchanged despite 
the difficulties. The Government concerned itself with the 
settlement and provisioning for the increasing numbers of 
refugees. Having inherited an underdeveloped economy from the 
British, the country could not cater to the day-to-day needs 
of the refugees, let alone those of its permanent residents. 
According to the U.N. High Commission for Refugees, Botswana 
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aided 30, 000 refugees between 1976 and 1978, of whom 20, 000 
later became residents in the country (Legum, 1980, B803). To 
alleviate the pressure of provisioning, Botswana directed 
appeals to the U. N. 
The difficulty of creating settlements remained the 
responsibility of the Government of Botswana while the 
logistic support was l argely provided by the U.N. Two main 
facto rs were important in determining the appropriate 
locations of the refugee camps: 1) the strategic value of the 
place and, the degree to which such a se ttlement could be 
accessible to Rhodesian forces which were targeting these 
camps, and, 2) the possible danger likely to be posed to the 
local population as a result of being adjacent to areas of 
potential trouble. Three different camps were established to 
absorb the i ncreasing refugee population, Dukwe, Francistown 
and Selibe-Pikwe camps. The Selibe-Pikwe camp, built for 1,000 
refugees, was overcrowded with 8,700 refugees in 1978. 6 The 
camp was later dissolved because of the booming population 
associated with the mining activities in the area. It was 
subsequently converted into a military installation. Of the 
three camps, the Francisto'Nll camp was closed because it did 
not offer enough flexibility to the Goverrunent in handling the 
insurgents in a densely populated area. In a tragic incident 
in 1978 , two people were killed and a few wounded after the 
6. See New African Yearbook: 1979 , 1979, p.92}. 
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Mophane Night Club in Francistown was attacked by insurgents 
armed with hand grenades. The Dukwe camp which was sustained 
after the other two were closed served the strategic needs of 
the country in that it was located in a sparsely populated 
D. mE U.N. CON'I'RIBtrrION 
The contribution of the U.N. towards the building of 
modern day Botswana constitutes one of the most remarkable 
achievements of the world govermnent. As a result of frequent 
border violations and the growing concern about the refugee 
problem, the U.N. became one of the regional protagonists, 
mainly to augment Botswana's efforts to continue assisting the 
refugees. At this time, the Government of Botswana was 
seriously reconsidering its stand regarding the creation of a 
permanent national army. However, due to the pressure of 
immediate domestic needs and the limited resources at hand, 
the only feasible action was to expand the PMU. The creation 
of a permanent national army implied a serious diversion of 
resources at the expense of other sectors of development. 
Realizing her predicament, Botswana directed her plight to the 
U.N., emphasizing the pressure for diversion of resources into 
defence created by the unlawful acts of aggression conducted 
by the Smith regime. 
Owing to the numerous complaints by Botswana, a U.N. 
Security Council mission under the chairmanship of A.A Farah 
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arrived in the country in February 1977 to identify the 
"special economic hardships facing Botswa:1d because of the 
need to divert development funds to security requirements" 
(Legul"l, :979, B817). After caref:1l assessment of the Sl tuation 





(the closest thing Botswana had 
to meet emergency food requirements and to 
a strat::egic food reserve. 
to allow Botswana to deal w~th the refugee 
Pursuant to the f~ndings ar.d recommendat~ons of the U.N. 
mlsslon sent to Bo".::swana in 1977, the U.N. took it up::m itself 
to articulate the difficu::'ties unde.::- which Botswana fou:1d 
herself as a resu::'t of the R":l.Odesian strugg::'e. Emphasis was 
placed upon continued effor".::s to moblllZ(' the eecessary 
resourr:ecs for ae effective program of financial, technical and 
rr.ater~al assis".::ance to Botswana and further organ':'zing a 
meet~ng of donors to look into the situation (U.N. Yearbook, 
1982, pp. 239-240). It was these concerted efforts from th", 
dor:ur cou:1tries which reduced the severlty at the shortage of 
funds ac:cruir,g from the creation of an army wh:"cr. was not ::'0 
the short· term plans of the country. As of 2 June 1378, the 
r';overnment of Botswana reported to the U.N. m~ssicn, 
cO:1trlbuti:ms arr.ounting to $46.8 million (U.N. Yearbook, 1978, 
p.238). These donations were channeled into domestic pro~ects 
such as construction of the :1ational a~rport, roads, 
ma.!.:1tenance of railway ne'::.wor?: and provisioning for refugees. 
A substant~al amount was used for vacci:1e production needed 
tor cmrbating the ~oot and mouth dl-sease in the northern part 
of the country. Thl s disease was one of the serious threats to 
tr.e countyy's bee: industry. 
THE CREATION OF THE BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE 
As the moves towards independence heightened l-n Rhodesia 
dUTl-ng the late 1970s, it became increasingly apparent to the 
Govern[Y1ent of Botswana that the exigency of the s'--':::..lation 
required a mill-tary force with capa.oilities beyond those of 
the ?MU. With the set of events along tr.e 
Rhodesla/Botswana border, the Government quickly abandoned the 
lnitial plan to expand the PMU because indications were Lhar: 
no amount cf expansion or revita~ization could enable it to 
w~ ::hst:and the challenges of it styonger Rhodesian 
coun;::erparts. It was in the heat 0::: t:Je events that the 
Parliame:1t passed "a Botswana. Defe:1ce Force Bill on 2S Mayr'=1 
1977, provi.ding Ear Doth a "regular" and "rese::ve" forT2 
goveIn.o::d by a Council appointed by the President" (I.,egGm, 
1.')79, p.817) ':'I"'.R PMU was dissolved and its former perSOLnel 
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(approximately 1, 000) became tr.e f::)Under r:teml:;e!"s Of the 
presel'.t day BDF. The Government estimated early in 1977 that 
r.os'::s directly attributable to the war in 7,1mbabwe came to at 
le:>st P65 millL.JO ( U.S. $52 mill~on in :'976 dollars) and the 
BDF, formed ~n April 1977 to counter the '::hreat, cost another 
1"20 m::'ll::'on (:;.S. $16 million in 1976 dollars) during its 
f~rst: year. 7 Given the circuIl'.stances under wh~ch the nat~or.al 
army came to be created, issues relating to its Slupport were 
co:.. addressed fully in the initial stages. The BDF 
cCIccer.trated its scarce resources on training and avoided the 
purc.tase of soph~sticated equipment beyond its abil:.ty to 
mair:tain a:J.d susta::'n (Snyder, 1996, p.l36). Its new recruits 
ap.d officers received bLlS~C military training and were 
immediate::"y cr.annelled into active service, the mai.n 
preoccupation being border patrols. Training was conducted in 
Botswana, Zambia and to a lesser exter.t, in the Unlted Kingdon 
by British instructors under a spec1.al arrangement entered 
-:'Eto between tile two governments. 
OVERVIEW ON BDF 
The Pres~::ie:1t of the Republic is the Commander-in·Clnef of 
the armed forces. T~c; latter comprise two main flanks, ground 
forces and an air arm. Because of the size of the arrced forces 
and the fact that tr.e BDF is an in:antry-or::.er.ted military, 
7. See New Afr~can Yearbook: 1979, (1979, p.92). 
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the command structure has been designed such that all 
subordlnate commanders report to a single Commander. Since the 
forrnatior. of the Br:F, recruitment into the armed forces has 
neen voluntary. The 8DF has been growing steadily and its 
current total armed forces strength is approximately 7,000. 
Chances of further expansion remain feasible because of the 
incn!asing responsibl:Cities of the military both at home and 
outside its own perimeters. As part of the on-going expansion 
program, a. new mi=-itary base has beer. erected at Mapharangwane 
(northwest 0': Molepolole) and will become fully operat::'or.a: at 
the end of 1.994. The installation will be used by the air arm 
and other i:l.fantry units. 
The primary mission of the BOF since its formation has 
beer. coun:::cr-pene'.::ration and counter- ::'nsurgency. 8 Surrounded 
by trouble-torn n(:>ighbors, the BDF has been fighting tooth and 
nail to enSUTe that its territory is not being used to attack 
its stror..gRr nelghbors. I;:: suffered repeated enc::mnters with 
the Rhodesia!l forces in ~he latE' 1970s. In one of the most 
tragic incide:1t.s eve:r- experlenced by the auned forces in 
Botswana, 1.5 s:Jld:.crs were killed in an ambush by Rhodesian 
forcE;;S in FebruClry 1978, at Leshor:"lo, near Kdzur.gula duri!lg one 
0::: the lntensive patrols conducted by the BDF. 
Operating :;'n a volatl:"e security contexL, lhe BDF has be Pot'. 
geLt.ll1g a large~ share ot the national bt.:dget. Its flnancing 
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has developed into one of the most costly undertakings for the 
country. Many other domestic projects were suspended in the 
past as the need for a strong national army continued to make 
its impact felt throughout the 1980s. Events in South Africa 
were the main cost drivers during the 1980-1990 decade. The 
increased Governmental attention on the BDF meant that other 
security-related departments could not be developed adequately 
because of the limited resources. Realizing its shortcomings, 
the Government further diverted the BDF into internal security 
duties which could have otherwise been undertaken by the 
understaffed Police Force. "The BDF also assisted the 
Department of Wildlife and National Parks with anti-poaching 
activities".9 Both the Wildlife and Prisons Departments have 
received supplementary training from the BDF since 1988. With 
the increasing regional security concerns, the BDF has also 
spread its missions into the U.N. peace-keeping operations. 
Botswana has contributed troops to both ONUMOZ and UNOSOM. 10 
9. See National Development Plan 7: 1991-1997, (1991, 
p.438) . 
. ONUMOZ refers to U.N peacekeeping operation in 
Mozambique while UNOSOM refers to the Somalia one. For details 
regarding African countries participating in the U.N 
peacekeeping operations, see The Military Balance 1993-1994, 
(1993, p.199). 
V. BOTSWANA AND SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1966 
In order to understand Botswana's defense pla:1nlng 
strategies, there is a need to examine the dynamlc 
relationship with South Africa. Economic, political, social 
and :nilitary factors between the two countries have been 
inextrlcab:'y intertwined. The large number of t~es between the 
two states have always left Botswana open to a host of 
r:lan:'..pulative interferences by South Africa (Imrie & Young, 
1990, p.12). This ir.teraction limited Botswana seriously when 
she was confronted with matters pertaini:1g to South Africa. 
Unlike other African sta'.::es which had the advantage of being 
d~stant f::-om South Africa and being less dependent on South 
Afr~ca, Botswana's was confronted by constraints regarding the 
<;"xtent to which she cou:!.d oppose South Africa. Consequen:::i.¥, 
during t:-J.e period following independence, afte::: 1966, there 
has been a not.iceable shift in the manner ln which Botswana 
was willing to take positions contrary to South Africa's 
perceived interests (Niemann, 1993, p.28). The dependency 
relationshjp be::ween the two countries, ac~ing as a limiting 
factor for Botswana, and the persistent fear of military 
reprisals from the Pretoria regime, tended to deterIT.ine Lhe 
degcee of flexibil~ty she could enjoy in dealing wit~ South 
Afrlca. 
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ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY AND INHERENT PROBLEMS 
One of the most vital weapons possessed by South Afr::ca in 
her controversial interaction with Botswana has been the 
gigantic economy, strong enough to make its impact felt 
throughout the entire subcontinent. The dilemma facing 
Botswana's position regarding the South African economy has 
been that of being one of countries largely dependent on the 
very economy which was simultaneously controlled by her 
historica l enemy. As a member of the Southern African Customs 
Gnion (SACU) , a 1969 Agreement in which South Africa plays a 
pivotal role, Botswana's policies geared towards opposing 
South Africa have historically displayed a substantial degree 
of restra i nt. 
This goes to explain why representatives from Botswana and 
other Frontline States (a movement geared towards promoting 
the politics of liberation) found it difficult to endorse 
concerted efforts during various U. N. sessions which s ought to 
uproot apartheid through economic sanctions. Such moves were 
likely to have negative and far-reaching consequences in 
Botswana more than wi thin the borders of South Africa herself. 
This has been largely aggravated by the absence of any ports 
for receiv ing a large volume of imports. It is a:::-guable, 
therefore, that, at the heart of Botswana's foreign policy 
administration, has been the sensitivity to South Africa's 
economic hegemony. 
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The uneasiness on the part of Botswana came when South 
Africa occasi::mally threatened to exploit the dependency 
re:i.aLions by reg>.llating the volume of goods channeled i:1to 
8ot:f;"',lana. Despite the threats, Botswana was not prepared to 
abandon her perceived benefits likely to accrue fro:m a 
democra':.ic and multi·racial South Africa. In summarizing the 
nature of the relations between South Africa at the OAO Summit 
Ccnfere:1c~ ir. 1969, President Seretse Khama stated: 
The strong incentive for South Africa to ma:1ipulate her 
comparative advan':age in the economic field to the detri:mer..t 
of Botswana has been partially f>.lelled by the preparedness on 
the part of 30tswana to question her domestic policies while 
at the same time being dependent on the South Africa's 
economy. 
1. Introduction of Botswana's Currency 
~he fragility of Botswana at the hands of South Africa 
was enhanced by the fact that she :::-elied on South Af:::-ican 
currency (the Rand) from 1961-1976. Given this situation, 
Bot_swana had serious limitations if!- implementing her own 
policies wh::'le her "power of purse" was an i:1separable aspect 
of tl:e South African mar.etary policy. Realizing the 
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constraint s emanating from the lack of her own currency, 
Botswana took a strategic move to introduce her own currency, 
the Pula i n 1976. 11 
Apart from giving Botswana the leverage to make 
independent dec i sions and reducing her reliance on her very 
enemy, this measure has been very beneficial to Botswana due 
to the problem of prolonged hardships in South Africa which 
saw the Rand being devalued frequently. While the South 
African giant economic infrastructure dwarfs that of Botswana, 
prolonged political upheavals within South Africa have worked 
to the detriment of the country. Consequent upon this problem 
has always been the unintended vulnerability of investors in 
the trouble- torn environment. The longtenn payback of the 
introduction of the Pula has been its considerable reduction 
of Botswana'S reliance on South Africa, thus an achievement "1.:1 
the security realm. The Botswana Pula has since been pegged to 
stronger currencies like the U.S. Dollar and the British 
PounCL Botswana and the Nkomati Accord (1984-85) 
The mindset in Pretoria was that a hegemonic economic 
role was the key factor in asserting control and setting 
limits to Botswana's autonomous inclinations. Economic 
11. The basic unit is the thebe (the nation's shield). 
Pula means "rain" (let there be rain). The currency derived 
its name from the cime-honored traditional notion held by the 
cit:.izenry, namely, that there must be plentiful rainfall in 
order for them to survive as an agricultural society. For 
further details see Morton et al, (1989, p. 2 6) . 
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supremacy was becoming an increasingly vital national interest 
which South Africa could not afford to compromise, rr.ainly 
because it Wi;iS a means to the political end down the road. 
After Botswana's contribution towards the creation of the 
regional organization, the Southern African Develop!Tlent 
Corrrrnittee (SADC) in 1979,12 the Pretoria regime became 
insecur@c in the face of a group which explicitly sought to 
reduce the reliClnce of the regional states on its econorry. The 
result was the pressure for a series of non-aggression pacts 
between South Africa :md individual regional states, com;nor.ly 
classified under the general label of the infamous "Nkomati 
Accord",13 a specific agreemer..t between Moza.mbique and South 
VII. 
Africa entered into in 1984. 
Having successfully signed the pact with Mozambique, 
South Africa believed that the same could be applied to 
Botswana. As a result there began a long and protracted battle 
in which the Pretoria regime revisited its strategies 
repeatedly to coerce Botswana into signing the pact of 
"peaceful co-existence~. The trick at the heart of such a pact 
was to undermine the collective efforts of the regional 
states. In a situation where South Africa would "reasonably" 
believe that the terrorist actions were exported into her 
borders from Botswana, then military or any such punitive 
action could be taken against Botswana under the pretext that 
~he agreement had been invoked. Had the pact been signed, 
Botswana would have had to revisit her historical open-door 
policy because it was obviously going to constitute a lively 
source of conflict running against the provisions of the 
agreement. In brief, al l the previous agreements entered into 
by Botswana such as being a member of Frontline States, could 
cot remain in force after submitting to the pact. As a result, 
Botswana declined to follow Mozambique and enter into such a 
pact with South Africa. 
Even more important to South Africa was the strategic 
significance of Botswana to the operations of SADe. Botswana's 
capital, Gaborone, is the home of SADe' s Secretariat, 
guerilla organization. For Further details, see Legum(1988) . 
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therefore, a crucial target to be overcome by South Africa in 
her attempts to bring her neighbors in line with her regional 
agenda, aimed at defending apartheid. Signing such a pact 
would mean that virtually all the meetings commonly held by 
regional states against South Africa's economic weapon would 
be reasonably interpreted to be Botswana's failure to honor 
the pact, hence justifying military action. The commitment 
attached towards such a pact would have been strong enough to 
see Botswana compromising her commitment towards the struggle 
for peace and stability in southern Africa in exchange for 
"good neighborliness" with South Africa. 
It is understandable therefore that, President Masire 
maintained an uncompromising position on at least four 
different occasions in which the South African delegates 
attempted to persuade Botswana to sign the pact. The President 
further made his pOSition before the American Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on 10 May 1984 (South Africa Using 
Pressure to Force Pact) as follows; 
The proposal to sign an agreement similar to the 
Nkornati Accord is illogical and unreasonable in that, 
unlike Mozambique, there are no hostilities between 
Botswana and South Africa. Such an agreement will 
provide South Africa with a pretext to invade 
Botswana, thus endangering our hard-won independence. 
South Africa is threatening to deploy its powerful 
army along our common border. However, Botswana will 
not sign such a treaty, regardless of the 
pressures .14 
14. See INDEX to the Fore; gn Broadcasting InfOrmation 
Service- -Daily Reports: Mideast and Africa, April 1984-March 
1985, Vol. 5, Part I (1986, p.59). 
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Botswana's consister.t and prolonged refusal to sign such a 
pact added tu her vulnerabil ity at the hands of South Africa. 
It was a difficult. reality for South Africa to accept Lha::: a 
counLry as srr.all and economically weak as Bots'''''ana could 
withstand her pressure. The result of the prolonged tug-of-war 
was a punitive raid in wh~ch 12 people were killed by South 
African Ocfcr.ce Force (SADF) on June 14, 1985. To iust~fy i::;8 
actions, the Pretoria regime resorted to i:::.s usual rhetoric of 
accusing BotswaI'.a ot harboring what it described as ANC 
Ler"t"crists. Tr.e severity of this bizarre relationship -:"n which 
econcmics and military dominance were manipulated as 
inex::rical::ly intertwined factors only came to assume different 
dimensions in 1988 with ascendancy of Frederick de Klerk to 
tr.8 South African presidency. However, in all these changi::1g 
relaLions, 8Gonomic hegemony remains a constar.t variable. 
B. POLITICAL RIVALRY 
While L'1ere was no quest_ion rega:::-ding the bilateral nature 
of economic relations between South Africa and Botswana since 
=--966, there was a hist0r:'cal concern about their interaction 
at the political leve=--. As countries led by govern:nents with 
diCimet!:'ica=-ly opposed views regarding majority rule, their 
po:'..itical exchanges verged 01: a rather understa:1dable but 
complicated not.ion 01' destabilisation, appearir.g more like a 
zero-sum relationship in which one side sought to wi n over its 
c ounterpart. Botswana's strong conviction has always been 
that, as long as the Pretoria regime failed to grant franchise 
to the majority in South Africa. she was not going to 
compromise even if that meant cont i nuat ion of strained 
relations. 
In looking at Botswana, the idea is not to prejudge 
whether destabilisation was not a useful category in a 
taxonomy of state-to-state relations, but rather to suggest 
that its use in the Southern African context has been (for 
understandable reasons) almost entirely polemical and 
propagandist (Imrie & Young, 1990, p.16). Botswana's refusal 
to recognize the apartheid system cherished by the Pretoria 
regime resul ted in a relationship which could described as an 
interac:._on governed largely by the principle of right versus 
roight. 15 
In one of the most embarrassing but fruitless historic 
episodes in 1987, the Pretoria regime, through Lucas Mangope 
of Bophuthatswana Homeland, attempted to force Botswana to 
15 The use of the notion of right versus might is 
borrowed from the t itle of book by Henkin , Hoffman, 
Kirkpatrick, Scheffer et aI, (1991) who explore the legality 
of the U. S. military actions against her weaker neighbors 
since the 19808. Such scholars examine the U.S. invasion of 
Panama in 1989 and the collective response to the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 with a particular emphasis on the 
interpretation of international law regarding the use of 
force. Their particular emphasis is laid upon the actions 
purportedly taken by the very members of the U.N. when their 
national interests are at stake. 
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recognize its histcrically questionable and regressive 
homelanrl. system by disrupting railway networks between 
Rotswa::la and Ylafikeng (in Bophuthatswana). The strategy was to 
continue wi th the disrupting activities until Botswana 
"accorded the homeland a true and due sovere::gn treatment". 
:2:ven more important was the fact that the move threatened the 
1969 SACU .lI.greement. To defuse this matter, Botswana went 
ahead with alternative p::'ans to construct railway facil::'ties 
at Rakhuna (inside Botswana), which would enable trains from 
S~JUth Africa and Botswana to be handed over =here instead of 
Mafike::lg in Bophuc:hatswar.a. 16 Realizing the failure of this 
strategy, South Africa rever-ted to a mo-::e prClctical policy of 
ra:1ki ng her- priorities. Fearing to lose both in the economic 
and political fields, she chose to endorse the alte>r:1ative 
made by Botswa:1a as a ·;.lay of promoting her own economic 
i:riterests. 
In deali:1g with Botswana, South Africa has always relied 
upon her muscle power more than the governance of 
international law and humanitarian principles expected to 
prevail between two :1eighbors who a::::-e members of the U.K. For 
undersc:andable reasons, nation states corrmonly adhere to 
5nternat:"or.a::' law if it .is not in direct conflict with Lheir 
"sovere:ign ccmmitments". The foremost and c::::-ucial South 
Afr-ican national interest, namely, the preservation of the 
apartheid system, precluded her- fr-om submitting whol ly to the 
humanitaria:J. principles enshrined in the U. N. Charter since 
these were two opposed forces. On sovereign grounds, South 
Africa developed a selective instinct with respect to the use 
of the U. N. Charter as a frame of reference. Since the 
formation of the U.N. in 1945, there has been a noticeable 
pattern on the part of the Pretoria regime to place an 
excessive emphasis on the principle of "non-interference in 
the domestic affairs of the respective members", Article 2 (7), 
since it "reasonably" provided her with a latitude to pursue 
her national interests without "undue external scrutiny". 
On the other hand, Botswana's rel iance on diplomacy as a 
weapon and a crucial variable in her security equation, 
derives largely from Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter, which 
stresses the importance of regional arrangements for purposes 
of peace management. Historically, diplomacy has been used by 
Botswana to supplement her weak defence posture and the 
obvious advantage of the prolonged and collective global 
opposition levelled against South Africa's political values. 
While it was clear that the Pretoria regime was opposed to 
Botswana's political orientation, especially the open-door 
policy, the regime simultaneously sought some kind of 
legitimacy and recognition in the eyes of Botswana. Like all 
governments, even the most brutal and coercive, the Pretoria 
regime tried to make citizens believe that its laws ought to 
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be obeyed and thilt it is legitimate 1:0 use :or-ce against these 
who :::"esist, and furthe::- sought to bridge t1'.e po:itical gap 
between itself and its neighbors on the basis of the same 
reasoning. 17 
Because of her controversial pOlitical goals, South Africa 
experienced limitations in seeking regional 
acceptance. TZlis goes to explain the hypocrisy ·,lsed by South 
Africa in explOiting the facade of anti-Communism to appeal to 
t.te West as the sale "protector" of her req-ioea: neighbors 
against the spread of communism. South Africa was hoping to 
ilc~ieve recognition as the protector of her weaker neighbors 
from <.::he threat of communism. When this acknowledgement was 
nut given by the neighboring states, the Pretoria regime often 
resorted to the use of force under the pretext that the very 
neighbors were pro-communist. Such measures often ended up 
adding to her already tar:nished image, internally, regionally 
and globally. 
C. MILITARY RELATIONS 
Military relations between South Africa and Botswana 
revRal oae interesting distinct:ion, namely, two diametrically 
opposed perceptions abou'.:- the role playe::i by the military as 




power equaticn throughout the apartheid era revealed a rather 
difficu:Ct but understandable phenomercon of the military and 
politics being two forces presented in close proximity. 
In a turbulent South African landscape, the art of 
statesmanship resided in the ability to manipulate politics 
am! military pcwer jointly in order to enhance the maintenance 
of apartheid. The two we:::-e used complementarily in a man:1er 
which could be summed up as conforming to the Clausewitzear. 
principle of "war being the continuation af politics by other 
IT.eans" Perhaps even more Significant was t.he willingness 
to stretch t!1e notion beyond its original parameters to 
accommodate the conflictual political culture. With the ever 
narrowing options for the regime in its defence for apartheid, 
military thinking and military methods became more central 
than ever before to the upper echelons C 'outh Africa's 
b·~reaucracy (Rotberg, 1985, p.4J. Perhaps 
signif~cant was the overriding readiness to give "poli~.ics and 
war" c:;.n equal treatment, to accommodate the confl ictual 
political culture. South Africa purported to trace the tr.reats 
to apart:heid as originating among her neighbors. They then 
became the victims of her broad mili':.ary strategies. 
The military relations between Botswana and the Pretoria 
regime since the mid-1970s came to be largely a function of 
this mindset in which the regime felt that neighboring 
countries had a remarkable contribution to its internal 
affairs. The "total countermeasures" employed by the state 
involved the steady militarisation of South African society, 
and the growing deployment of the SADF in a coercive role 
inside and outside the country (Cock & Nathan, 1989, pxiii). 
To sUIl'Jllar ize the South African preoccupation with the military 
means of resolving internal problems, Hanlon (1986) observes 
that : 
'The new government argued that white South Africa faced a 
"total onslaught" from beyond its borders, and that it 
must respond with a "total national strategy". This was to 
be a "comprehensive plan to utilize all the means 
available to the state according to an integrated 
pattern" (p . 7) . 
It was the implementation of this plan throughout the 19808 
which saw Botswana shifting her focus from the north-eastern 
border where the independence of Zimbabwe had been completed, 
to her long south eastern border with South Africa. 
Apart from the militarization of politics in South Africa, 
any discussion of military relations between Botswana and the 
former must acknowledge the crucial fact that the small 
defence force in Botswana was created largely for purposes of 
providing capabilities against the ensuing problem of 
':nsurgency. It would be a grave mistake to study the 
inventory of the BDF as an attempt to parallel the SADF 
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armament inventory. The nuclear capability aside, the SADF 
conventional weaponry alone, has been an immense build~up and 
accumulc;: ion which Botswana cannot conceive of paralleling. 
Against this background, the relative success of Botswana in 
the prolonged confrontation against South Africa has been 
largely a product of diplomacy coupled with security 
guarantees (the subj ect of the next chapter) more than 
military preparedness. undoubtedly the clear military 
contribution has been in the area of conducting patrols as 
part of the strategic defence against insurgency problems. See 
Figure 3. 
Perhaps even more significant in understanding the 
military relations between Botswana and South Africa has been 
the constraints facing South Africa in her power proj ection 
propensities. 
Questions have always been asked as to why the Pretoria 
regime could not simply run down Botswana given the enormity 
of its military? It seems possible to suggest that the absence 
of a common thinking representative of the various ethnic 
groups within the borders of South Africa has always acted as 
a serious power constraint. South Africa lacked one of the 
vital elements of national power, the historical-
psychological· sociological element, 19 thus limiting her real 
19. For details regarding the significance of necessary 
variables in the any country's national power, see Hartmann 
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'Tras 
J.r.c ~ther ::egio:co:.::' ",.tat.es 'we,:",; --:::onfined co::; ;::,.::.:1::;. ::-: all t:"1ese 
t::te struggle for legitimacy and recognition in the eyes of the 
neighbors while at ~he same time attempting to use military 
raids ar.d threats as strategic moves. 
Despite all ~he i:nbalances werking in favor of Botswana, 
::he quality of decisions reached by her policymakers revealed 
the indispensable tendency to appreciate the enormity of the 
South African mi ~ itary inventory and the potential threat of 
i';:.s utility for attaining longtcrm goals. Throughout the 
198Cs, what deepened the dilemmas :or Botswana was the 
ex':'stence of a possibility of arbitrary use of military might 
when presst.;.re from liberation movements heighter-ed inside 
SO·.1th Africa. By banning opposition parties in 1963, Lhe 
Pretoria regime, like its counterpart in Rhodesia, had pushed 
beyond its borders what could have been a!"l internal struggle, 
hence the need to look at neighboring countries as sources o~ 
security problems. 
1. Botswana's Security Response 
The events which were to follow as a :::""esult of t:he 
pressure from South Africa saw Botswana acting tactfully in 
order to preserve her sovereignty in the eyes cf the 
aggressive Pret_aria regime. Changes were !"lot confined only to 
the military a!:""cna, but were spread to the legislative fie:!.d 
sir-ce it was becoming increasingly apparent teat a sour.d legal 
justification to Lhe public was required to enable the 
Gover=ent to cO:1t:r:-ol the situacioD. An addi.tional requirement 
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for instituting lega: changes with respect to the prevailing 
security condltions ',.;as ,_he fact that the measures were in 
t:"lemselves, a radical departure frcl!:1 the personal liberties 
ensi1rinRd in the country's constitution. 
The National Registration Act of 1986 
In Oct-ober 1986, the GoverI1l1'.enL_ ictroduced the 
national identity card as a requirement for all residents of 
Botswana, a'.mcd at disting'Jishing citizens from refugees ar.d 
terrorists who '"ere continuing to be a 5ec'~rity problem for 
the ccun:-_ry. The system was launched i.n 1987, providing for 
the cornpu:'sary registration of all citizens of the age of :6 
and above, Cl.:1d of non-citizens resident in Botswana for more 
than six months. 20 The idea of the Act was not welcome in 
certain qUilrters, especially opposition parties and privately 
owned press. Opposi=ion was based on the sll!lilarity between 
the p!:cposed Act and the South Africaa r.otion 0:: :'dent-Lty 
cards ir.troduced fer blacks as part of ::he politics of 
separate devC'lopment. As A. new idea which replicated ::he evils 
of apa:ctheid South Africa, the Act could not be easily 
endcrsed by Biltswana (Daily News, 2:'/3/1956). 
The mai:! objection revalved around the fact that 
jdcr_tity cards were interpreted as an infringenent upon the 
pc'rscEal libe!:ties of the citizens who were not used to 
See Natio:1al Development Plan 7 1991 1997 (1991, 
p. 394) . 
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carrying identity cards. However, the Act eventually passed 
the test mainly because of na~ional agreement regarding the 
inevitability of security measures in the face of the 
::"ncreasing problems of accusations for harboring terrorists 
and the fact.: that the SADF continued to impinge on the 
country's security. Despite the initial opposition to the 
national identity card, it carne to serve other domestic 
purposes such as providing planning data and alleviating the 
voter reqistration problem which could not be conducted 
satisfactor l::.y without adequate identification procedures. The 
i.dentity card, commonly known as Q........M;l..lliI (an expression 
::"rr,pl.yi.ng identification in the standard language) among the 
locals, has since become an indispensable feature of IrBny 
adr:linistrative procedures in public and private circles. 
b. The National security Act 
Following the uune 14, 1985 raid by the SADF 
which 12 people wet'e killed, the Government of Botswana had no 
choiC-:G but to embark upon a strategy based on introducing 
legis:La~lve changes solely for purposes of enhancing :"l"'-ternaJ 
seC'..1:::-1ty. ':"0 deter people from collaborating wi':h elernent:s 
likely to !:le prejudicial ':;0 the security of Botswana, the 
Goverr..ment increased the pcwers of the police forces as one of 
the li,nited avenues available to it. 7he Act savG law 
enforcement officials, wide and eX'censive powers, including 
L'1e r:'..ght to search witr.out wa:::-rant by any officer 0: the rank 
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of sergea:1t or above, if he considered the case to be an 
eIT.erger:cy and that in the interest of the country, it needed 
imIEediate attfmtio:1 :Daily News, 1986}. 
South Africa viciously sought to discourage 
Botswana from pursuing policies which were net in the best 
interest of the ?retoria regime, especially the erroneous 
belief [hat anti-gcvernment elements were operating from 
Botswar:a. In addition to the negative reactions from Pretoria, 
there was also ,(C'sis::ance at home to t:!1ese security measures. 
Many Batswana saw these changes as a radical departure from 
their societal norms. Throug:!1out their post- independence 
] ives, the idea of conferring such imrr.ense and discretionary 
powers upon iaw-e::1forcing officers was unheard of and O::1Ly 
t:::-aceable ::0 SouL'1 African apartheid policies intended to 
enabl~ the government: to oppress people. The main fear 
associaLed with such a change was that it could easily lend 
itself ::0 misuse since there were no ~imits regarding its 
admir.istration. "Discretion" was seen by the opponents as too 
wide and vag'Je a term to be used as a guiding principle. In 
explaining the exigency 0: the situation under which the Act 
'was enac::ed, t'le Minis::er for Presidential Affairs and Public 
Ad:l'.inistration, Mr Ponatshego Kedikilwe pointed out ::hat: 
nature of Botswana society, there has been no 
the ki:ld of the proposed legislation in the 
including fatal bombings 
:orces have shattered 
introduction of 
In a simi lar vein, the judicial system was enhanced to 
enable the courts to carry out the~r duties in a 
cons i stent wi th tr_e preva:l ing security environrnent _ For an 
offence committed under the act, "where lack of' lawful 
authority or excuse is an ingredient, the burden ot proof' was 
placed GQ the acc",sed" (Daily News, 1986). Coupled with these 
measures weee open invitations extended ~o the South Af::-ican 
Gcvernnent to come and point out centers of ANC or guerilla 
aCLiv:ties withir.. the borders of Botswana. Such offers never 
met any favorable responses from the Pretoria regime. Despi te 
the displeasures associated with the changes, the GoverrJUen;: 
of Botswana bad to redouble its efforts to ensure that a sense 
of s€curit_y consciousness was instilled among the citize:1S and 
!Jerhaps even more important] y, to exonerate the country from 
the accusations of working closely wit~ the "terrorists" 
against the Pretoria regime. 
Growing Military Expenditure and Duties 
The growing pressure f::;-om the Pretoria regime saw 
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the defence budget being increased dramatically. The need for 
an increased defence budget was further necessitated by the 
fact t hat the Government had increased the responsibilities of 
the EOE'. Due to the limited capabilities of the police forces, 
mair:.ly in the field of manpower, they could not provide the 
badly required service of manning road blocks and night 
patrols ["0 conduct elaborate and thorough searches. The police 
forces were further confined to their primary role of law 
enforcement. The EDF , with more than 3,000 men who were better 
trained and well equipped compared to their police 
counterparts , was given the additional responsibility of 
int_ernal security. This arrangement was meant to be a 
temporary one, intended to remain in force solely to augment 
the security functions of the country at the time. See f'igure 
4. 
The dominant feature which developed as a result 
of the increased responsibilities of the BDF was the 
escalating budgetary trends of the mili tary. While this trend 
was conducted at the expense of other domestic projects, the 
general citizenry had to learn to live within the constraints 
of the avai l able resources at the time. The diversion was 
prolonged longer than it was initially anticipated. It could 
not be reversed until the end of ~988 when the events in South 
Africa turned more inwards with the release of Nelson Mandela 
and the official recognition of opposition parties in the long 
embattled Sou t h African political arena. 
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FigUre ,. Botswana Military Expenditure {1982-1991). 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1992. 
During the period between 1986 and 1988, road 
blocks were mounted on all major roads leading to South Africa 
from Botswana. All in-coming and outgoing traffic was 
subj ected to thorough searches by the BDF personnel. Border 
patrols were also conducted on a wider scale. In rnaj or towns, 
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night and day patrols were a corrmon feature. In a bid to 
ensure that these natL:mal efforts did not :neet resistance, 
:::he COmr:lander-in-chief, Dr Quett Masire, stressed ::he 
following points in a message hroadcast over Radio Botswana to 
the :1ation: 
In ordE':'r to ensure that the BOF was prepared to face L1.e 
c:ha1lcnges of defending the country against South Africa, the 
Government entered into some defense-related arrangements with 
t_he British Government. In add:'..tion to the already available 
services of the =ndian Advisory Training Team, the British 
Advisory Training Team further augmented the training 
sessions. Traini:1g was directed more into the technical fields 
such as a':"rcraft engir.ec::::-ing co\.;rS8S in wh:'..ch Botswana was 
deficier.t. In a similar manner the U.S. continued ~o extend 
different triJ.ining packages to the Govermne:1t of Botswana. 
Su::::h packages covered mil~tary a:1d personnel related -:ields. 
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VI. THE COLD WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 
Vuring the Cold War, regional security effor.ts throughout 
the world were largely governed by global ~sm. Typical of the 
bipolar nature of the world at this time, it was not 
surprising that the Eastern and Western blocs were engaged in 
a prolonged corr.peticion for spheres of influence across t;:"e 
globe. SOl..:thern Africa came to be transformed into one of the 
battlegrounds for superpower rivalry. From the perspective of 
the U. S, the nat\~re of the confrontation in southern Africa 
WCl.S appropriately forecasted as follows; "The real cho~ce we 
will face in Southern Africa in the 19808 concerns our 
readine::;s to compete with our global adversary in the politics 
of a changing region whose future depends on those who 
pan::"cipate in shaping it." (Crocker, 1980, p.345i. Under the 
circumstances, the security of small countries like Botswana 
was overshadcwed ar.d seriously impacted upon by the 
preoccupations t:'18 superpowers i::1 tr.e region. 
Whilst it was clear e.o the international community th<lt 
the involvement of superpowers in many regional affa::'rs was 
l<:lrgely geared towards their own national interests, regional 
policymakers had to face the difficult realit_y 0: accepting 
the fact that the superpowers themselves bad become 
i:1dispensable parties in t.be efforts Lowards prorr.oting peace 
and stability in ~he region. The prolonged question of 
Namibian i:ldependence was one area in which the involvement of 
the superpowers played a crucial role. Lack of superior 
weaponry ar_d other sources of power enabling regional states 
to ' ..... ithstand challenges peculiar to thei:::- own environment OIl 
their own, rendered them subordinate to the init~atives of the 
supe!:powers. wi th their preponderant capabil i ties, the 
superpowe:cs ir.:luenced the nature and extent of regiocal 
security management patterns. 
Throughout the ent ire period, the two global giants, the 
:;.S. and the Soviet union, were engaged in a difficult 
exe:rcise 0: placing their ideological commitments before all 
other considerations, even if these meant acting agai!"lst the 
perceived interests of the regional states. For this reason, 
L"leir respective policy administration was responsive to the 
threat posed to the ideology, the foremost and important 
considerati.on which could not be sacr~ficed '.Jnder any set o~ 
circums1::a:1ces. The overriding preoccupation -;.lith :"deology led 
to wavering and i:1consistent foreign policy approaches on the 
part of the superpowers. "'or this reason, a lot of desperate 
rC'gional parties saw theil; involvemer.t in regional affairs as 
an opportunity to be explo:"~ed in either bringing them to 
power or asslst:"ng in the overthrow of their rivals. For 
example, t.he Soviets spent about SSOC millio:1 to install the 
MPSA (Angola) in power; supplied weapons and other materiel, 
l ranspo::::-ted Cubans, gave a rcraft and mainta::'ned a naval 
squadroYl off Luanda (Rotberg, 1985, p.56). On the other hand, 
South Africa, using t.he facade of anti-Cot:m1Unism, exploi'.::ed 
the collegial rapport between herself and the U.S. during the 
Reagan era by destabilising her weaker neighbors under the 
pretext that they were pro-Communist. In totality, the Cold 
War period was a double-edged sword which sometimes wor:ced to 
the detrimer:.t of the regional actors while ur.der certain 
circumstances i.t created at: environment i.n which there were 
spill-over benefits realized in the fonn of security 
assistance [rO:11 the superpowers. 
A. U. S. POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA 
ThE" U. S. policy towards southern Africa during the Ccld 
'I'l"Clr was largely a function of the cO:ltainment theory. 
Containment, as a policy was launched by the Truman 
Ad.'T,inistration, desigr.ed to Erustrate Soviet expar.sion 
aLLen,pts. Z3 In general terms, the U.S. policies during the 
Cold War placed the containment theory above all 
cunsiderations. W.'la~ the U.S. did in far-flung regions :Jf the 
wcrld was justified in terms of tho Soviet threat and the 
strategic ':"mpor:;ance of a partic·.llar area t:J U.S. interests. 
Because of the seriousness of L"l2 r.eed to curtail SQvifet 
expansion, the policy wa~ broadened tc ensure that it offered 
'-l.dequate flexibility ~ n foiling the spread of co:nnn:nism, eve~l 
23 See Thfe ManaG"'men~ of Security Assist.aoce, (l980, 
?p.l"2l} . 
to the seemingly i:l.significant areas. 
In addition to the desire to overco:ne communism, four 
fundamental factors perpetually ran at the heart of U.S. 
torr;;ign policy: 1) commitment to human rights coupled with the 
anti-apartheid spirit, 2) the need to act decisively in order 
to protect the South African economy against the rising tide 
of violence, 3) U.S. investments in South Africa, and 4) the 
desire to end Cuban presence in the region (Legum, 1988, pp. 
xix·xxi). Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. foreign policy was 
shaped by these factors. However, their individual importance 
was largely a f'..:-· ction of the perceived Soviet threats in :::he 
region at. a glven time and U.S. domestic policies. The 
striking feature of the U.S. foreign policy administrati::m was 
its inco:1sistent in attempting manipulate 
diametrically opposed factors, the maintenance of "friendly" 
relations with South Africa while at the same time being 
critical of its apartheid practices. 
':Caking harsh measures against the pro-apartheid Pretoria 
regime, an ally against the Soviet, was see:-l as a serious 
tradeoff of U.S. i:1terests. Where anti-Soviet issues were 
concerned, the proceeded cautiously in order to 
compromlse other goals ever. if such moves implied :ci.sking 
international criticism. 
Despite the globalist approach to the sovlet problem, lr.e 
U.S. carefully narrowed its focus t:o countries satisfying its 
immediate strategic needs, a propensity clearly ampliEied :n 
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southern Africa. The National Security Study Memorandum 39 
(NSSM 39), formulated in 1969, was intended to cover the 
entire region of southern Africa, its attention was 
concentrated primarily on U.S. interests in South Africa, an 
emphasis which suggests that South Africa was the cornerstone 
of U.S. southern African policy (El-Khawas & Cohen, 1976). The 
policy was designed as an expedient framework intended to 
further the broad strategic interests in southern Africa by 
focussing on economic, political and military priorities of 
the U. s. Other regional states such as Botswana were treated 
as dependent variables in the overall equation. 
B. BOTSWANA AND THE SUPERPOWER RIVALRY 
In dealing with the Cold War confrontation during the 
1980s, Botswana was able to capitalize on friendly relations 
with bath superpowers, thus benefiting from their diplomatic 
support in times of crisis (Zaffiro, 1992, p.59). This trend 
emanated from the fact Botswana was part of the non-aligned 
movement. The underlying principle of non-alignment was the 
conviction that global peace could be attained without 
identifying with either of the two superpowers. Close 
adherence to either side was seen by members of the non-
aligned as a potential step towards heightening the 
possibility of open warfare. Despite the efforts on the part 
of two superpowers to lure Botswana into identifying closely 
with either, she has always remained consistent about her 
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conunit.ment to the non~aligned movement. 
While Botswana adhered to the non-aligned movement, her 
commitment to democracy, human rights and her geo-strategic 
position were factors which attracted the U.S. In a similar 
vein, in an effort to diversify its foreign diplomatic, 
economic, and politico-military relations, Botswana placed 
considerable emphasis on encouraging the U. S. to be an 
economic benefactor and shield against pressures and threats 
from South Africa (Zaffiro, 1992, p.S8). Because of the 
perceived mutual benefits between the U.S. and Botswana, the 
latter was placed under a group of "friendly" countries 
eligible for security assistance in accordance with the broad 
containment theory. 
The specific security assistance program under which 
Botswana came to be placed was called the International 
Military Education and Training (IMET). The objectives of this 
program were summarized in the FY 1980 Congressional 
Presentation Document as follows: 
..... [the purposes of IMET] are: f:;.:!.st to encourage 
effective and mutually beneficial relations and 
increased understanding between the United States and 
foreign countries in furtherance of international 
peace and security; second, to improve the ability of 
participating foreign countries to use their 
resources, including defense articles and services 
obtained by them from the United States, with maximum 
effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-
reliance by recipients; and, third, to increase 
awareness of international human rights issues. 
This program supports the foreigr.. ~olicy objectives 
of the United States by providin'J :1 effective and 
r~latively inexpensive contributit to the military 
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Many at-her cou:1tries became beneficiaries cf =MET, under 
simi:ar a:crangements of using the prcgram as a component of 
the broad Cold War strategy. The conditions underlying this 
program were ',miform among the recipient countries. 30tswana 
signed the agreement in March 21, 1980. The agreement 
restricted itself to the training field more than oL'1er areas. 
Subsequent to the agreement between the two count:::ies. 
Botswana received a wide range of training pac:-::ages froIT- the 
U.S. To this date, the agreement remains in force. 
The exact nature of the interaction betwee:1 the U.S ar.d 
Botswana were never amplified as much as the interaction 
between the U.S. and South Africa. This was partly due to the 
tact thaL Botswana was careful in distancing herself from t!:lc 
Cold Wac:" rivalry. :;:: seems possible to suggest- t.hat the 
dilemmas associated with the non· alignment provoked skepticism 
pa,--t of the U. S. There is reasonable ground believe 
that the p81.i.::;ymakers could not easily establish the 
extent to whicr. t_hey ::;culd trust non-aligned countries wher.e 
U.S int~re8t1:l were at stai:e in the [ace of the Sovlet threat. 
:"n The 
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On the other hand, South Africa explicitly articulated her 
anti-communis'::. inclinations and went further to incur heavy 
military expeEditure to further the corrunon interest between 
her and the U. S., t:'l8 primary goal of ending Soviet presence 
in southern Africa. 
C. THE CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMEN'T POLICY 
Even tr.ough President Ronald Reagan was no exception t.o 
the implementation of the U.S. grand strategy (contair>..ment), 
his pol~cy towa~ds southern Africa was a sharp contrast to 
those of his redecessors. The differences in policy 
approaches wer" 3. function of the party (Republj can or 
Democrat:'c) orieEtation and to a large extent the personality 
o~ a given president. The ascendancy of Reagan to the 
presidency in 1980 witnessed the reversal of the U. S. policy 
from the past orientations in which South Africa did not enjoy 
a:1y form of "close collaboration" with the U.S. to a IT.ore 
friendly interaction. 
The Carter administration criticized the apartheid 
regime, called for majority rule in South Africa and accorded 
the Front Line states a much mor:-e active role in settling 
regional conflicts (Price, 1982, p.51). However:-, under the 
Constructive Engagement policy, the Reagan administrati.on 
sought to resolve regional problems through a strategy w:'lich 
was based on the prinCiple of "friendship" and ack:Lowledgment 
of the cr:-ucial role played by South African Governmen~, both 
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w::'thi:1 its borders ar.d in tr.e longstanding regional question 
of Namibian struggle for independence. The policy was best 
slirnrrarized by its chief architect as follows; 
At t::J.e base of the strategy there remained the overriding 
preoccupatior. with a potential Soviet and Cuban challenge to 
the United St.ates in the region, and the assumption that this 
challenge would require continued stability in South Africa 
itself (Picard & Groelsma, 1989, p.238). Anti-cor.lffiun::'sm as a 
vital U. S national interest and a common ground betwecn the 
two was exploited by Sout~"1 Africa who temporarily enjoyed the 
diversiQQ of scrutiny by the West from her apartheid practices 
chiefly because of her commitment to the serious and i:nmediate 
thYeat of ccmmunism and seized the opportunl ty to conduct 
punitive raids on her neighbors. It was this "friendly 
:'..ntcraction" between the Reagan AdDir.istratiol"'_ and South 
Africa which le::i Hanlon (1986) to maki:lg tr.e obse:!::"Vation that; 
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According to the desperate regional actors, the U.S., 
could have embarked upon a different policy which would have 
enhanced the efforts of the OAO "lnd regional states in 
isolating the Pretoria regime in order to resolve regional 
problems. Perhaps one of the most serious repercussions of the 
constructive engagemen" policy was its strengthening of South 
Africa militarily while at the same time opposing weapons 
acquisition by other regional states. "To encourage the South 
African "trust", the Reagan administration further relaxed the 
Carter bans on military exports to South Africa and backed a 
1982 International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan to Pretoria" 
(Hanlon, 1986, p.23). The far-reaching consequence of this 
move was that it augmented the already controversial South 
African appetite for using military means to resolve domestic 
and regional issues. It was during this period that South 
Africa seized the opportuni ty to conduct brutal raids on 
Botswana and other neighboring countries on the pretext that 
they were pro-communist. 
Pursuant to the alternative use of anti-apartheid and 
anti-corrununism for strategic r easons, in October 1982 South 
Africa sent leaflets into Botswana attacking the government 
for harboring South African refugees, and even more 
significant, purchasing Soviet arms. This incident came after 
Bot.sVlana had purchased arms from the Soviet union in 1980 for 
purposes of strengt.hening her security in the wake of 
continuing problems with her neighbors. Opposition ") this 
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transaction was spearheaded by South Africa ir. a propagandist 
manner as a way cf coesolidating Western s"Jpport and verifying 
that r.er neighbonl were pro- ccnnnunist. For strategic reasons 
i:: was logical that, South Afri:::a could not condone any 
measures which contri.blt_od posi':iveJy towards strengthening 
her nei.ghbo:::-s militarily. According to Zaffiro (1992), 
Botswana's pu:::-chase of arms fraIT. the Soviet U:1ion provoked 
s:<.:epticism on the part of the ::.S. as reflected ir. the 
congressional sel:timents regarding its future with Botswana: 
The oVGrriding sF!nsitivity of the U. S. to playing a 
tactful game in opposing South Africa led the Vice-president 
ot Botswana, Mr Peter Mmusi to the conclusion that "this now 
pJaces ':1'.e U"n::':ed States clearly ::'n league with South Africa 
in aggressi_ng and fo:nent i ng instabil i ty it'. the reg lon 1F 
':Johns~on & Mar::in, 1986, pxix:. Desperate as most regional 
sta::es were at the hands of South Africa, there was virtually 
notr.=--ng they ceuld do in the face of cooperation between two 
undoubtedly powerIul nations, Sout:") Africa and the u.S. Ever. 
~ere serious was the fact that U.S. support for Pretor~a was 
seen by regional policy-IT-akers as a de:iberat.e move to 
undermine the ef:"orts behind the crea-.::ion of SADC. The 
difficulty confronting Botswana in dealing with the U.S. was 
that under ':;rese circumstances it was not easy to rely heavily 
OIl the U. S. where Botswana's secu!:ity was under threat from 
South Africa. 
However, w!1at deepened the dilemma for Botswana was the 
fact that the U.S. could tactfully suppor'::. Botswana under 
ce:ctain circumstances which could not be spelled out clea:cly. 
For examp:e, in early 1986 the United Kingdom and USA pledged 
military aid to help Botswana to deter South African attacks 
and terrorist infiltration. 25 However, what remained 
questionable was the nature of aid to be accorded Botswana by 
the U.S, in the event that she was subjected to military 
action by South Africa. Throughout the Reagan era, t:'le SADF 
conti.nued to violate the territorial integrity of Botswana on 
the pretext that the country harbored terrorists and was pro-
co:nmunist. To justify these actions to the West, South Africa 
emphasized the collaboration between Botswana and the Soviet 
:;;nion. 
wt.ile the Reagan policy towards South Africa has been 
cri~icized for- strengthening South Africa to the detriment of 
:-:ter neighbors, contributing towards loss of lives (especially 
withi!1 South Africa) and creating pol:'..cy dilemmas for 
countries like Botswana, there were secondary benefits gained 
by BOLswana and the entire region. Namibia's move 
25. See Africa Sout.h of the Sahara (1994, p.170). 
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indepe:1dence in 1990 was partly an outcome of the increased 
military might of the U.S. -backed South Africa which was 
becoming increasingly difficult for the Soviet U:1ion to 
withstand . Without the involvement of the superpowers in the 
region, it seems possible to suggest that South Africa would 
have acted unilaterally and unchecked for a long time since 
the combined efforts of her neighbors were not sufficient, 
unless augmented, to end her hegemony in Namibia and Angola. 
Since the presence of the superpowers dete=ined the nat:ure of 
policies regionally, equally significant in te=s of their 
withdrawal was the hasty moves towards a democrat i c revolution 
in South Africa in the absenc e of the anti-communism facade. 
The camouflage which South Africa had used for a long time has 
since become a thing of the past, hence the ease with which 
negotiations were conducted in South Africa to move towards 
the current multi - racial society. 
D. THE POST-COLD WAR SCENARIO 
Now that the Cold War has ended, the entire globe is 
engaged in a perpetual search for reasonable means , .... ithin 
which security issues can be addressed. The patterns of 
interaction within southern Africa have been altered 
fundamentally. The longstanding question of SOllth Af:::-ica' s 
transition to democracy has been completed and brings about a 
new set of circumstances which seemingly call for increased 
concerted efforts. In the pas t, the superpowers were actively 
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invo'--ved in southern Africa to ensure that apartheid, the 
pri:r.ary source of regional problems, would be overcome. With 
:-_he jow;lfall of the white mir:ority government, what is the 
position of Botswana with respect to the new South Africa? 
Given the major reforms in the post-apartheid South Africa and 
the sensitivi::y of the South African economy to such problems, 
what are the possible impl:'cations of the dependency relations 
between South Africa and her regional neighbors? Needless to 
mention is the fact that despite the downfall of the white 
minority government, certain key variables attributable to 
South Africa's advantageous position remain constant and 
cannot be altered easily. The military might and mineral 
wealL'l of the country remain sources of power which are less 
lii;:ely to he affected by the transition to democracy. 
What remains crucial for Botswana and other regional 
states is the need to redefine security management to nake it 
responsive to the new challenges. Adding to the new set of 
problems are environ,'uental factors which continuously affect 
::he ent i::::-e reglon regardless of geographic bounds. 
uncertaint ies regarding the perpetual involvement of the u. s. 
i:1 far-flung regions continue to deepen t:-:tE' dilemmas. During 
the Cold War rivalry, there were strong incentives fer the 
u. s. to extend sJ..;ch prcg::::-ams as lMET to various countries in 
t.he name of anti·co=unism and the abilit.y to spend its 
resources for: purposes of influencing policies in southern 
Africa. Problerrs generated by u.s. foreign policy aside, the 
influence exerted on Sout~ A':rica to withdraw [rom Angola and 
Na:nibla, and the imp1ementation of ::nternal reforms (within 
South Africa) were nowr.ere near the capabilities cf the 
yeg~onal states corobiced. 
1n the event that South Africa chooses to retain her 
j:resent prepo:1derant capabilities for p:'aying a hegemcnic 
role, doubts exist as to whether it would be justifiable fer 
the U. S. to inter.lene in regior.al prob-I ems emanati:lq from sucr. 
asyr.rrnetrical j:ower relations. Given the current tone of 
congressional debates regarding the use of U.S. troops in 
rogi8flS without any strategic significance to the U.S. it 
seews !Jossible to suggest tr.at sec'.lrity guarantees will not be 
made c=asily. Humanitarian reasons alone are not sufficient to 
act as p~etex:s for involveme:lt in far flung regions. The 
rCCEOIlt withdrawal of U.S. troops fro:n Sorralia (Operation 
Restore Hope), is an indicator of the lik.ely trend ot U.S. 
defense pclicy beyond the 19908. 
fIJi th the end of the Cold War, the incentive fer escalat:"ng 
defense budgetary trends seems c:njustified in the eyes of the 
American publjc. T.'le problem of the opportunity cost 
associdted with national security has become a great concern. 
In tile absence of a well defined policy rationale for 
engagement in Africa, the U.S. could very well begin a gradual 
disEOngagement fro:n the continem: (Robinson, 1992, p.39). 
In all these Changing relations, the bottoml:"ne revolves 
around the exacL place to be occupied by snaIl COl.:ntTies such 
as Botswana whose delicat:e geo~strategic position remains 
unal::ered amidst all these diversifying secur::.ty concerns. Can 
regionalism be relied :lpon as a security management platform 
in scuL"lern Africa, if so what kind of a transformation SllOUld 
SADC undergo to cope with the new challenges? It secms 
possible to s'Jggest that any study wh::'ch establishes the 
poten:::ial for the success of SADC would be of relevance to the 
ongoing debates about possible security management patterns at 
a reg::'onal level, perhaps even more seriOl':s at the global 
level. 
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VII. A REGIONAL APPROACH TO SECURITY: SADe? 
The post -Cold Wa::: e!1vironmer:t has come to be largely 
charact:erized by uncerta~nties regarding the patterns of 
secClrity management to be pl1rsued to ensure tr.at peace 
prevails. Cold War era b:"polarity was at least_ predictable in 
seIlSE:' t::-:tat balancing by joining either the Western or 
Eastern Bloc tended to indi;::::ate the parameters within which 
regior:al or internalional security couLd be addressed. 
However, the ::"lew era is such that protessior.als from various 
disciplines are engaged in a perpetual search for reasonable 
mechanisms capable of being used peace and confllct 
managemer.t. 
Politico.:' scientists constitute one group continu::ng lo 
debate whether globalisrr. or regionalisrr, should prevail to fill. 
the current VaC\lUffi. Despite their ackr:owledgement of the 
presect lirr,itations of the C.N. and chdnging perceptions about 
secur:..ty g:'obally, MacFarlane and Weiss (1992) are pessimistic 
Clbcut regionalism. They base tr.is arg-..Jment on the following 
observations: '-.) using recenT: case studies on conflict 
mandy""ment in a !1unt;·~:c ot regicnal o:cganizaLions, the hopes 
pidC,,:,d or. these organizatione arc uc-duly oprimistir. if not 
al::.ogethe:::- misplaced, while regional 8rganizatio:1s are best 
suited ::0 mediation in local conflict because of their 
farnil::'arity with local conflicts, thei:::- =:ir.ancial and 
organizational limitations do not permit them to be entrusted 
with conf:Lict management, 3} the defin::'tional ambiguity 
relating to Lhe concept of a "region" (in ':::erms of geography, 
size, lack of inclusiveness, etc) is a serious limiting factor 
' ... hich plagues regional organizations, 4} the extent to wr.ich 
the power irrbalances at the regional level impinge on the 
bellavi:::>r of the regional organization and complicate conflict 
resolt:.tior., and 5) the organization's capacity to cope with 
internal as opposed to interstate conflict. 
However, the seemingly irredeemable history of certain 
regional organizations should not be used as a guiding 
principle on which analysts can reasonably base their general 
rejection of regionalism. 'l'here have been certain exceptional 
cases in which the groupings have been successful and 
cO::J.tinuously face compelling circumstances to contribute 
remarkably towards peace and security management in future. 
Prospec:s for collective self-reliance and conflict: resolutio:1 
exist in certain regions 1 ike sOUl::hern Africa where SADC's 
"Program of Action" is geared towards security arrangemenr;s 
(~ow, 199G, p.69). Despite its initial preoccupatior. with 
econor.:1ic pursuits, SADC has successfu::'ly worked towards 
reasonable security management in a region which was tu~bulent 
for a long time. 
The exceptionalism of SADe as a regional organization 
tends to draw heav':'ly from a wide range of variables 
prescr-:'bed by the geopolitics of the region. Given the fac,:: 
that Sout.h Africa has become a democratic and multi -racial 
society, the politica::' atmosphere in the entire region has 
been altered dramatically. On the basis of all the current and 
forrcseeable patterns of interaction, ::his chapter examines the 
chal::'enges cor.:ronting SADe aYld the possibilities of its 
t'.ltu:c-e success as a security management platform. 
It seems possible to study the changes conf::-onting SADe in 
a similar manner in which the North Atlar.tic Treaty 
O:!:'ganization (NATO) j,s currently being assessed in terms of 
i':.s future roles. NATO was originally strengthened by tote 
existence of the soviet tr.reat. Now that the Cold War is ove:!:', 
questions emerge regarding its fc:ture management trends and 
challenges. Concerns with the decl ining economies and growir_g 
poplllat:;,on creaces pressure for alleviating deteriorating 
sicuatioIlOl al: over the world. In a similar manr.er, SADe was 
formed as a response to the ensuing threat of the t_hen 
aggr-?ssive South Africa. With the post-apart_heid South Africa, 
the l:nifying factor among the founder merrbers rerr.ains to be 
redefi:led. 
A. ORIGINS OF SADe 
The fi SADC wafl held at Ar-lsha, rr>clnzania in 
July, ~979, aimed harmcnizing development plans Lind 
reducing che region's economic dependence on South A[rica, 
r'esulti:lS (9) meml:;er countries from southern Africa 
signing a treaty. 26 SADC came into existence mainly because 
of SO'J.th Africa's attempts in 1979 to exploit her comparative 
advantage in the economic field by advocating a regior.al 
grouping in which local states could benefit from combined 
economic pursuits. The proposed grouping, a "Constellation of 
Southe:rn Afr:"can States" (CONSAS), was to become fully 
ope:::-ationaJ w-:'th South Africa playing a pivotal role (Jaster, 
1980, p.33). 
The st_rategic thinking behind the creation of COl'JC'AS 
replicated t!l.e Warsaw Pact interactions, which were a series 
of bilateral treaties with Moscow at the center, an 
arrangement that did not hamper "fraternal" socialist mi.litary 
policy (Grundy, 1986, p.86). Similarly, neighboring states 
would be restricted to the provisions of CONSAS (favorable to 
the Pretoria regime), without altering the military supremacy 
of South Africa. Although the chief architect of CONSI\.S, 
Foreign Minister Pik Botha emphasized economic rather L'1an 
political interaction among the members, the neighboring 
sto.tes wer,," skeptical aboc;.t the ulterior motives underlying 
such a grOtE' ng. Add::'ng to their skepticism was thei"t-
farr.iliarity wlth the possibility of mili::ary reprisals from 
South Africa in the event that any member could be 
"reasonably" interpreted to be invoking the provis::'ons of 
CONSAS . 
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From the perspective 0: the regional states, CONSAS was 
an economic weapon intended ':.0 conso:idate wr.ite minority rule 
thr8ugh coercive diplomatic arrangements which were to be 
hunored Dy all the members. Because of the overriding 
preoccupatior. with political gai.ns, Soulh AE.rica emphasized 
the principle of non - interfere:l.ce in the domestic affairs of 
i:l.di vidual members as st i.pulated in the u. N. Charter under 
P.rtiele 2 (7). The guidelines of L"1e grouping deliberately 
distanced themselves from making any specific references tQ 
the applicatton of enfcrcemen';:: measures provided for under 
Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter. 27 
Realizing the danger inherent in CONSAS, regional states 
created SADC as an alternative to CONSAS. South Africa 
advocated interdependence, while other regional states chose 
:0 embark upon a strategy of dependency reduct:'on. SADC was 
thus a clear case of regional balanci!1g. 28 While it was clear 
to SADC member states -:.hat they were invitir:g military 
reprisals (destabilieat-:'on could work either way) by ref'..lsing 
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to join hands with South Africa, they were largely driven by 
she fear of the South African hegemonic role in CONSAS. 
OVERVIEW ON SADe 
Prior to the establishment of SADe, there was the 
Fron::line Il'.ovement, that was largely functional in political 
tenns. In con::rast, SADC managed to impact upon the fragmented 
and individualistic approach to widespread regional concerns 
through concerted efforts towards managing resources. At its 
inception, SADC deliberately restricted itself to the economic 
sphere w:"thout any specific references to political or 
military goals. The Committee avoided the unintended problems 
of c::-eating a tense mood in which South Africa could easily 
conclude that tr.e operations of the organization were Cl direct 
provocation levelled against her. However, with the improving 
political situation at the end of the Cold War when the 
pressure for democracy was undoubtedly becoming difficult for 
the Pretoria regime to suppress, SADC redefined its 
iccegration mer'hanisms, envisaging a cooperating and friendly 
Sout~ Africa. 
It is not in t!:1e scope of this thesis to venture into a 
detailed examination of the past successes and failures of 
SADe in the ecoI'.omic field (quantitatively). The reduction of 
depende:c.cy on SOllth Africa was a strategic move fashioned on 
the management 0: resources. However, there has been a 
noticeable ir:lprovement in t~e eco;1omic performance of 
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i nd:"vidual countries at_t_ributable t.o the existence of SADC. In 
accordance with the collective regional stabili ty concerns, 
the organizatien has nade a tremendous achievFC~ent. Mere t~an 
anything else, the greatest success has been in ereatir.g a 
cegional identity and a sense of a COffi."11on destiny anollg the 
~~n nember States (SADCC, 1992, p.3). 
1. Management Pattern 
3eca":..lse of the wi de al-eas to be covered in an attempt 
to r.lax~mize benefits from the available resources throughout 
t:be entire reg':'on, the architects of SADC embarked upon 
sect_oral responsibilities which were divided ar.long the 
individual rr.embers. The allocation of respective sectoral 
responsibilities was based on t::he type of resources traceable 
to individual membFCrs and their potent_ial ciipabiU ties in a 
9" i ven area. However, a 11 members were expected to contribute 
s~gn::'ficantly to t_he overal::' goal of harmonizing the resources 
held by ::'ndividual members for the bene:it of the enti!:·e 
regio:1. :ndividual sectoral responsibilities were purely 
intended toO 8erve as coordination l!lechanisms harnessing the 
efforts of the members as a Wd-Y of encouraging complimentary 
relationships. Sectoral allocations were conducted as 
follows: Angola (er::ergy); Botswana (cr::>p resea:!::ch and animal 
diseClse contr::>l); Zambia (development fund and Mining); 
Ta:lzania (indus~ry:' Malawi (£is:leries, forestry, ar:d 
wild] i_f8); Zi~abwe (food secu:city) ; Mozambique :'~ransport and 
com.1l'J.nication; Lesotho (soil conservation and land 
ut~lization); and Swaziland (mar.power) .29 
The most important assumption underlying t'lese 
allocations was to help individual members to develoj:.: the 
respective resource capacities and alleviate problems peculiar 
to their geographical location with the ultimate goal of 
interdependence. For example, Bot- :;war.a has been one at the 
ir.1partant bee!: producers (South Ar:rica excluded), hence the 
need to assign the sectoral responsibility which enhances her 
already avai:!.able capability. In a similar vein, Lesotho as an 
',mdulating and mountainous country has always had problems of 
maximizing food production under difficult conditions of 
severe soil erosion. Exposure to combined regional efforts has 
been a remarkable effort towards addressing the probleIT.s 
coafronting individual members. 
The selective nature of the allocations should not be 
used to judge the potential resources of all the members. =~ 
.... 'as ratr.er a matter of devising a managemen:: technique for 
purposes of the smooth running of the organization. The 
tou:cist :'-ndus,:ry is one area in which most of these countries 
derive t.heir national income. They continue to manage 
icdividuaJ industries at national levels, though acknowledging 
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their allegiance to SADC. Zimbabwe is currently debating 
whether to reduce her l arge elephant popu l ation for control 
purposes and environme!ltal preservation. This is one decision 
which does not fall specifically under the jurisdiction of 
SADC but has implications for the r egional cooperation. 
2 • Funding for SADe 
The most crucial question facing SADC has been funding 
i ts operations. Most of the economic pressures confronting 
individual members made the process of releasing a substantial 
amount of financial assets towards the organization a 
difficult one. Funding for projects has been obtained from 
donors, in t ernational agencies and individual countries 
(Maasdorp, 1985, p.93). The impact of financial limitations 
has not been Eel-: severely partly because there was a sense 
of shared purpose among the members, thus making it difficul t 
for them to ditter so openl y as to prejudice their unity 
against South Africa. With the Sou th African democratization 
ar.d the end of the Cold War, there exists now, a possibility 
for a notable negative shift in attitudes towards funding for 
SADC. 
The need to ensure that the region was stable and 
worked efficiently t.owards the eradication ot apartheid 
provided a strong incentive for donor agencies to release 
their funds towards the operations of the anti-apartheid SADC. 
The recent downfall of the pro-apartheid government leaves the 
region il'. a dilemma regarding further assistance from former 
doncrs. This situation is aggravated by t!":le fact ':hat, in the 
post-Cold War era, governmer..t elites and publics seek to 
divert_ expenditure from foreign policy and security to long 
postpo:J.ed domestic, economic and social needs (MacFarlane & 
Weiss, ::'992). Similarly, there exists a strong possibility 
that the foriller donors will focus on the economies of former 
corrununist cCl,-mt:::-ies in Eastern Europe (Nathar., 1992, p.5S) 'od 
(Zaf:iro, 1992, p.66). In terms of infrastructural 
developIl'.ents and the possibilities of gua:::-anteed cash flows, 
Eastern Europe undoubtedly offers better investment 
oppor::uni ties. 
Wi':.h these possibilities, the need for managing 
reglona:.. security now falls squarely on the s:1.oulders of the 
very regional actors. The new era is such that southern 
African cour.tries should become true p:::-otagonists in managing 
security related affairs to ensure that tr.ey suppress even the 
secrr,i.ngly in", gnifica:1t differences likely to promf1::: an 
undesi.rable trend of escalating defense expenditure. This will 
lead to a situation where the limited :::"esources are released 
towards other areas which have not been addressed i:1 a long 
time due to the volatile security context. 
C. THE U.N OR SADe? 
There are no doubts regarding the superior capabilities of. 
the world governm.e~lt over those of regional organizations. 
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fact this is a reality which sovereign states themselves have 
long acknowledged by joining the U.N. and allowing the 
decisions reached by the latter to take precedence over their 
sovereignty on those occasions when they deem dilution of 
sovereignty to be in their interest. 
The crucial point is not one of supremacy, but rather how 
the two should operate together in order to manage peace as an 
indivisible entity. In all these changing relations at the 
global level, regional organizations are will most probably 
become an indispensable phenomenon in world peace and security 
management. While these organizations vary greatly in terms of 
capabilities, their comparative advantages lie in their 
ability to mediate, cultural affinity among members (not in 
their logistics or military) and perhaps even more significant 
their preventive diplomacy roles. 30 The usefulness of SAne 
comes in as the only regional grouping currently capable of 
diversifying its responsibilities in order to undertake this 
mammoth task in southern Africa. 
It seems possible to suggest that where a goal of 
congruence exists between two entities like the U.N. and SADC, 
a "blending theoryn remains as the most reasonable approach to 
security management. The proposed "blending theory" 
30. See Laurentti (J.992) and Boutros-Ghali (J.992). 
Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary-General of the U.N. elaborately 
lays out a detailed plan founded on three different notions; 
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. Boutros-
Ghali harnesses regional organizations as major and 
indispensable players in his proposed future plan. 
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acknowledges the mutual co-existence and complementary 
interaction between the U.N. and various regional 
organizations. In this framework, regional groupings shall 
assume the role of the core because it is at their level where 
intense action takes place on a gradual and continuous basis. 
The U.N shall playa supervisory role i.e., providing an on-
going assessment of regional activities. Detailed programs of 
action should be conducted by the regional protagonists 
themselves, thus relieving the U.N. of the pressure of 
addressing its lengthy agendas. The two must necessarily 
operate complernentarily because they have the same goal, 
namely, maintenance of peace and stability. Where prospects 
for regionalism exist, they must be encouraged because without 
such possibilities (such as in Cambodia, Rwanda and Bosnia) , 
mediation by the U.N. becomes a difficult process. The 
proposed solution to security management takes into account 
the limitations of the U.N. 
1. Limitations of the U.N. 
In as much as debates continue about the weaknesses 
confronting regional organizations, the U.N. has limitations 
ranging from its enforcement capabilities, impartiality, 
financial and procedural. The latter includes such as the 
power of veto which has always been the source of 
dissatisfaction among the disadvantaged members. Using this 
procedure, permanent members of the Security Council can 
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easily debili.tate the U.N. whenever they feel it is in their 
best i nterest. This provides an incent i ve to the ordinary 
members of the U.N. to address their concerns through regional 
organizations. In the changing global environment, sovereign 
considerations are becoming increasingly polarized with the 
multiple economic problems emerging lately. As a gathering of 
sovereign states, what the U.N. does depends on the common 
ground that they create between themselves (Boutros-Ghali, 
1992, p.1). The world government cannot therefore attempt to 
operate in a sphere which does not accord the notion of 
"sovereignty" the attention it deserves. By the same token, 
the U.N. cannot direct a lot of attention to sovereign issues 
since such a focus is likely to be prejudiCial to its major 
function of overseeing the activities of the overall sovereign 
SAnC is a case in point in which mediation in issues 
relating t o sovereign interests has been conducted at a 
regional level. After redefining its mission in 1992, the 
Committee established a tribuna l to arbitrate in case of 
disputes between members arising from its treaty. The use of 
this tribunal will most probably be extended to defUSing 
r:tatters which verge on sovereign and regional questions. One 
such matter arose in 1.992 between Namibia and Botswana over 
the ownership of the Sedudu Island in the northern part of 
Botswa!'la. In what many viewed as a potentially explosive 
scvereign issue, the twO countries, largely because of their 
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perceived mutual benefits, have appointed a joint commission 
to resolve the matter through peacefu l means, thus relieving 
the OAU and the U.N. of the burden. The importance of regional 
players in reso lving this matter is necessitated by the fact 
even where the U . N. has to arbitrate in a matter such as this 
one, it will still rely on the familiarity and inpu t of the 
regional protagonists themselves. 
The sensitivity of t he current and foreseeable 
patterns of security-related debates requires nation states to 
be the primary custodians of their own peace. It has been 
historically proven that leaving such a thorny ins titution in 
the hands of outside parties often gives rise to the 
"principal-agent" dilerrrrna. 31 Policyrnakers can only be aware 
of the impact of their administration r egarding national and 
regional security if they are to become actively involved in 
regionwide concerns. I n view of the impending dilemma, the 
incentive for decentralization on the part of the U.N. remains 
val id. 
31 The principal versus agent dilemma is commonly 
applied in economics as a description of a situation where 
employees in a given firm, especially managers (agents), 
pursue their own goals at the expense of the profits 
anticipated by the firm (employees). See Pindyck & Rubinfield 
(1992). In the context of this paper, the U.N. or any security 
guarantor, plays the role of the agents in regional security 
management while the pledging countries wil l represent the 
principal. Complications are most lik e ly to accrue where the 
anticipated security assistance is not realized, possibly out 
of circumstances beyond the operating capabilities of the 
U.N/security guarantor at a given time. 
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Decentralization is further necessitated by the ever 
diminishing financial contributions to t:-te U.N. by its 
!!lembers. Because of the "free-riding" propensity, in the past 
nation states failed to make contributions while at the same 
time enjoying the benefits from a "central pool" at the 
expense of others. An increasing number of countries are 
likely to hold back their contributions towards the operations 
of the U.N. since the justification for increased military 
expenditure has become questionable amidst widespread 
inf la tion problems. In this regard, the operating capabilities 
of the U.N. have become increasingly problematic. At the 
receiving end, are the former beneficiaries from the spill-
over benefits of the Cold War, those countries compelled to 
remake their budgets in order to survive the challenges of the 
"new U.N.", which does not offer any hopes of overcoming its 
financial difficulties. What remains questionable is the 
manner and the extent to which most of the former reCipients 
of the aid are going to adjust and choose some possible 
avenues which will truly alleviate the situation. 
One of the possible options available to security 
managers to utilize regional organizations 
responsibility centers. 32 Managers (represented by 
policymakers and other high ranking officials) will be held 
32 For an elaborate discussion of responsibi~ity centers 
accounting technique, see Deakin & Maher (1991, 
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accountable for the resources and operations of their 
,esgect=-ve sectors. In a decentralized U.N~ various regions 
serving as responsibility centers will provide a strong 
incentive for working within their budgetary constraints. In 
the past, costs have been approached in a fragmented manner 
w[:cre j ndi vi dual countries did not coordinate their securi ty 
efforts joint:"y, a factor which would have most probably led 
to red"clCed military expenditure. Within a given regicr 
orgc:r.ization, costs would be monitored carefully, creatine; 
obligation on the part of groupings to seek cost-effective 
methods of security management and defraying the underlying 
cost_s accordingly. Economic difficulties of the 1990s and 
beyond 2000 continue to shatter any further possibilities of 
unilateral action or explicit assistance programs. Where t~e 
responsibil::'ty to promote a stable region is shouldered 
collectively by regional actors, in which they shall, inter 
alia, be sensitive to costs, it seems possible that sU8h 
arrangements will give a fresh impetus to the interpretaticn 
Clnd challenges of security management. 
Finar.cial considerations aside, t~e U.N. Charter does 
make any specific references regarding explicit 
enforcement prerogatives to compel regional organizations to 
redress their potential sources of conflict. Operating on the 
pril1l::iple of goodw::'ll and, sometimes, the respect for 
sovereign rights, the \J.N. can only go as far as suppor~ing 
actior$ which in the realm of internalicmal peace and secu~ity 
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are deemed as ",ssc:1tial efforts towards promoting stability. 
In implementing certain decisions, tr.e U.N. ten::is to rely 
heavily 0:1 its iIT.plied pcwer more than explicit and legitimClte 
power, hence the fear to act ultra-vires t:.he expected norms of 
interLa::ional law. Similar ;;Jroblems exist at the :evel of 
:::egional orsanizations, though with one distinct attribu::e, 
the fact that_ respective members who are beneficia:::ies tend to 
have a stronger incentive for upholding decisions and 
intlucncing their quality. To this extent, the i:')centives for 
transforming SADC and utilizing it as a responsi.bility center 
remains a compel:;'ing i: not an inescapable measure in the 
search for peao~ and securit_y in the post - Co] d War 
environme;:1t. 
D. SOUTH AFRICA AND SADC? 
With South Afrir:a having joined SAlT as the eleven::!". 
member, ::hus co:npleting the regional process, the organization 
st:ands to redefir.e its goals. The rr.ajor questions faCing the 
entire ccgio;:1 are: 1} the nature of interact:ion between the 
various members with South Africa introducing her unparalleled 
econo:dc migr.t into the regional organ:'zatior., or the 
possibility 0: the region reverting to t:he idea of a 
"conste"-lation", 2) what happens if the gover:1ment of national 
L<nily fOC'-lsses more inward or internatior.a:Lly withoc:t mc:ch 
attention being given to bunediate regiona.l neighbors? 3) is 
it gOiLS to be ];:ossible to work towards a more equitable 
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distribution of benefits, and 4} given the foreseeable 
security-related problerr.s and the defence posture, what role 
is South Afrjca likely to play, a hegemonic role or base her 
pol ic~es on the expectations of other SADC member states? 
These questions constit:ute the main area of focus within SADe 
clOd will most probably determine its success or failure. 
Prior to the South African democratization, issues 
relat':'ng to equitable distribution of benefits among SADe 
members witl: diverse capab:'lities were deferred as a strategic 
move against South Africa. Unity against apartheid was the key 
regional coucern and could not therefore be compromised 
easily. With the new South Africa, there is a serious call for 
revisiting the objectives of SADC. For example, regional 
military institutions must become transparent in order to 
create a sense of stability. However, dependency reduction 
will continue to be a major preoccupation among merrbers with 
weaker economies. On strategic grounds, all countri~s need to 
wor/;: towards developing their respective economies. Their 
vulnerab:'lity before South Africa will continue diluting their 
capabilities in interactir.g with South Africa. 
Pcl:'..ci~s, strategies and programs of economic develop:ner.t 
should be ::-estructured in suc~ a way that all countries of the 
regia!:'. have a fair share of opportunities for investment, 
trade, employme:1t creation, etc. (SADCC, 1992, p.5). In a 
similar manner, i:t:teydepe::1dence will be c:1couraged among the 
SAD~ member states as way of enhancing regier.al cooperation. 
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The asymmetrical economic capab:'-lities of SADe member states 
against tha-::: :)f South Africa were compiled in 1989 as shown in 
Table I below: 
Table I. SADC COUNTRIES & SOUTH AFRICA- -BASIC INDICATORS 1989 
Soc.rce: SADCC Annua::' Progress Report 1989 1990). 
Pop. In I Area I G~;/~ap ~~p ~~~:e) :nillions lsq.kill) lCn) 
Angola 9.7 1,24 "l 610 7.72 46 
1.2 582 1,600 2.50 67 
Ijesotho 30 470 0.34 56 
Malawi 8.2 180 48 
MQzambique 15.3 802 80 1.10 49 
Namibia 1.7 824 1,030 1.65 
Swaziland 936 1. 66 55 
Tanzania 23.8 945 130 2.54 49 
2ambi.a 7.8 753 390 4.70 
?:imbabwfO 391 650 j.25 64 
SADC 79.6 5,703 363 28 87 
s. Africa 35.0 1,221 2,470 80.37 62 
The mos:: important factor w:"1ici"', will la:::-gely determine the 
success of corrbined ;:·egio!1al efforts is the ro] e ~ ikely to be 
played by Soulh Africa, the rr.ost serious and far-reaching 
alte;:·naLive could be t:'1e one described below: 
The possibil~ty of such an action can only be understood in 
t:::te context of the government of national unity attempting to 
reverse the structural inequalities of apartheid i0 f: .. or of 
the long oppressed victims of separate development. At t.he 
heart of apartheid was the maximization of economic benefits 
for the whit.e population. Its end implies a char..ge in the way 
South Africa will generate profits in future. The i=ediate 
policy consideration confronting the new South Africa is the 
at.tempt to address the problem of equitable distribution of 
social amenities and benefits in a manner congruent with t);"le 
expectations of the citizenry. The success of statesmen will 
be largely assessed in terms of their ability to satisfy 
illternaJ needs whi:e at the same time responding to the 
delicacy of the economy ane the interests 0:: the neighbors. 
On the other hand, there is noral argument emanating from 
::hR fact. that surrounding states have borne muc:1. of the burden 
of apart.heid all these years; should they bear the end of 
apartheid's burden as well (Boyd, 1992, p.147)? South Africa's 
neigllbors have histori.ca:i.ly upheld policies inter::ded to uproot 
aparthejd and have cor.sequently suffered destabilisation at 
the hands of the w~jte-m:Lnority government. It seems poss~iJle 
to argue thdt, desp~te these fears, :;here is a wide range of 
unifying factors between South ,'\frica aEd her neighbors 
despi::e the fears associated with a nationalistic po:icy. The 
la=-ter i.s absolutely neces!'la-:-y given the history of South 
Africa and wi...!.l undoubtedly le"d to a more stable South Africa 
ir: future. On "just.ifiable grol:.nds, an inward-oriented vit;io:1 
should not. be t.hought of as driven by self-interest .. 
Dissenting views shou:d rather t.ake into acco:.mt the necessity 
for the nat.ionalistic policy as a transition period despite 
it.s temporary disadvantages to the operatio:1s of SADC. It. will 
most. probably :icfer the envisaged economic benefits for the 
region, hopefully with a longtenn benefit to ::he very region. 
SADe's concern with the near t:er.n equit.able dist.ribu::ion 
of benefiLs should not be allowed to take precedence over it.s 
ultimate goal of being a stable regional organization. Within 
t.he southern Africa subcontinent, precautions should be taken 
Clgainst ally moves likely to jeopardize regionalism thro·Jgh an 
ear:y and excessive emphasiS on t.he economic be:l.efits 
L.raceable to individuCll countries. A heavy bl:.t. rewarding price 
h0.8 to be paid t.owards t.rue regional ir_tegratior_, ot:'lerwi8e 
t.he subcontinenL will reverL La its old frag:nented approach to 
regiom.dde problems. 
1:1 Europe, questions of equitable distribution of benefits 
have seriously threat.ened the creation of a. COIn.'Tlon Europea;:j 
market. Wh"ile simi:ar checks aed balances arc necessary in 
southc~rn Africa, ther", is a need proceed prudent:..y given 
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tr.e urgent need for combined regional efforts in many spheres. 
The exigency attributed to regional consolidation is currently 
taking precedence over the concern for equitable distribution 
0;.' benefits (economic ends). Historically, the gravitat::'onal 
pull of the South A:rican economy works to the detriment of 
the country during times of need when a lot of people move 
across the region in search of economic opportunities. To this 
end, South Africa needs a framework within which herself and 
t.he surrounding states can discuss these issues before they 
degenerate into security problems. 
For the newly born post-apartheid South Africa to be fully 
integrated into SADC, her neighbors must have the advantage of 
discussing the enormity of her military inventory and arms 
control measures. Chances of discussing military related 
problems among the IT.embers wi~l largely be determined by the 
willingness 1 the part of South Africa to ::'ntroduce changes 
towards her use of the military. The only medium within which 
these problem.s can be addressed remains SADC. 
E. INCENTIVES FOR REGIONAL COHESION 
Despite the vari.ous questions emanating ~rom t~e altered 
environment in southern Africa, there re:onains a wide range of 
variables in the regional context which increasingly draw the 
var~ous states towards regionalism. As t~e wOl.~ld becomes a 
global vil:Cage, practical realities such that, 
unilatera:'ism is not only anachronisti.c but arouses skepticism 
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among neighbors. The distinct nature of the geo·politics and 
commonality of interests provides a strong case for 
regionalism in southern Africa. 
~. Geography and Size 
The geography and size variables in the case of SADe 
have proved to be integral elements in the operation and 
cohesion of organization. The proximity of the members to the 
strife-torn South Africa played a crucial role in determining 
the composition of organizational membership. Owing to the 
clandestine nature of the South African struggle since 1963, 
when opposition parties were banned, the neighboring countries 
were directly brought into the struggle because the liberation 
movements saw them as a sanctuary from .... hich they could wage 
their struggle against the regime. As it became clear that 
countries adj acent to South Africa were prime targets of the 
South African intelligence machinery, the liberation activists 
maneuvered deeper into the interior as far north as Zambia and 
more to eastern flank of the continent, around the vicinity of 
Tanzania. 
During the systematic searches for refugees, all 
countries in the subcontinent were subjected to ~collective 
punishment" and scrutiny by the South Africa government in an 
attempt to thwart their collaboration against apartheid. It 
was this very setup which provided the criterion for size and 
membership. No country outside this ndestabilisacion 
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perimeter~ was willing to expose its citizenry to the 
perpetual threats of the South African military machinery by 
expressing explicit interests in joining SADC. 
The vulnerability of southern Africa to prolonged 
droughts has also played a significant part in forcibly 
bringing the region together. The catastrophic droughts which 
attack the region on a frequent basis have a distinct pattern 
of decimating the entire subcontinent on a unifonn basis, thus 
forcing the countries into concerted efforts in the face of 
the ,,"cological calamities which serve as an "invis:..,~le hand" 
in fostering collective norms. Because of similar economic 
difficulties in the northern part of the continent (see 
Figure. 5). the victims of draughts in southern Africa do not 
have alternatives but to work together within their region to 
address the problems. 
The mindsets of policymakers across the entire region 
are guided by an interplay of factors largely driven by the 
strategic location. Unlike other regional organizations whose 
members are dispersed over a given continent or from separate 
continents, BADC is different in the sense that it is 
responsive to problems arising from its immediate environment. 
As a sharp contrast, NATO is spread over two continents and 
was brought together by the Soviet threat. Valuable les80ns 
can be learned from possible NATO success in bringing together 
its geographically dispersed members in the face of current 
sentiments about revitalizing economies. Geographical 
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dispersion and distance can either dilute the sensitivity to 
certa~ n intrinsic factcrs. The willingnesg to be adequate] y 
responsivF> to regional problem;; is partially a function of the 
proxi::nity factor. 
2. Commonali ty of Interests 
SADC member states are brought :;ogether by a number of 
different factors which at"e largely propelled by his:;ory. A 
substan..:lal part of ::he popula;: ion in the subccntinent belong:;; 
to one large African family known ::11e Bantu-speaking 
!=leoale. They share cultural ties and a cornmon O'.lt:-"ock 
ernanatir:g from their history. One of the most significant 
unlfyir.g factors has been the desire to reconstruct their 
econcmir: and political institutions after the wit:'1drawv.l of 
tr.e colo:1ial masters. T:'le newly borr. post-apartheid South 
Ai:rica ~s no exception to this inclination. The long awaited 
day on whir.h regional efforts could be :::ru:'..y harrr_onized, has 
finally come. What remains te be done is the i.mplem~ntation of 
regional programs wit:'1ou:; t.he obstacle of racialism. 
3. Inclusiveness 
As history untolded, prac':.ical realities tended to 
depicl SlLlC as an orqanization cara:Ole of ccntribu:; ncr 
remarkab':'y towards the search for peace and security in the 
region. While SADe did not spell out explicitly ini:::ia::'ly, the 
rcle to be p:"ayed by SO'-ltll Af::-ica, it siIT.ul tanecusly accorded 
tLe liberation movements a rp'cognition status. Consequen':.l.y, 
SADe gained indirect support f:!;"om within South Africa because 
of its pursuit of ideals which diluted the preponderant 
capabilicies of the Pret:oria regime. Regional interdeper.de::lce 
and the dilemma of fighting for legitimacy by the white-
minority governrnent converged to ensure that the limitations 
generally associated with lack of inclusiveness did not hamper 
the operating capabilities of SAne. With the transit-ion to a 
nn . .;l ti r.acial society in South Africa and com..'TIon regional 
concerns, it seems the incentives for integrating mechanisms 
to ha:cness the efforts of SADe and create channels for a 
recognizable and binding forum will strengthen the aspect of 
inclusiveness within SADC. 
-4. Redefining the Balancing Strategy? 
In the past the major preoccupation of regional actors 
balance (mili tarily, politically, and economically) 
against South Africa. The dilemmas confronting the Pretoria 
reglme, especially the need to consolidate its power a:1d the 
desire to gain internal, regional and international 
recoqnition saw the success of the SADe balancing strategy 
that emphasized diplomacy rather than conver.tional and 
superior weaponry. Despite the apparent changes, the security 
dileTl'rnas associated with the enormity of Som:h African 
milit.ary will conti::lUe to be a source of insecurity for her 
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neighbcrs. 33 The strategic location of South Africa (situated 
dt the southern tip c[ the continent w::Jere '[he Atlantic and 
Jndiar. or::eans rr.eetj p:::-ecludes her f:::-om addressing ~e:::- defence 
post:ure without "due regard" of her nava:: (aed inheren'C 
economir::) interests from which the very neighbors are 
beneficiar:'es. 
Against this background, ';;he notion of balancing must 
necessarily be rede:ined witr.in Lhe broad pardmet.ers 0: a 
regional approacr. to sec..lrity while at the same time 
acknowledging the sensitivity of all the players 'Co certa:'..n 
chanqes and the aggregate effect on future :::-egional security 
patter:1s. ::lepending on the cdreful manipu::"ation of the 
politics of self· interest, the South African defense posture 
remains critical to t:he OVerall latent capabilities of the 
region. 
5. Population and Environmental Questions 
As southe:::-n Af:::-ica inevitably progresses towa:cds 
replicating the Malthusian Theory of scarcity, environmental 
ma:lag8:1'8nt becomes o1'.e of the cruciOi.I channels available :or 
respondiEg to c:he cballengfOS of the uncontrollfOd population 
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growth. 34 In most SADC IT,ember states, population growth rates 
have becn well above economic growth rates (SADC, 1992, p.12). 
As resourcE'S in d::'fferent countries get depleted, sQutr.er:::l 
Af:::ica will ::';;1creasingly become an arena in which Laegal 
border crossings will be rampant. There has been a disturbing 
trend since the mid-1980s in which "environmer:tal refugees,,35 
lured by comparatively successful economies in the neighboring 
countries have continued to find their way into countries with 
relatively self-reliant and stable economies. This phenomenon 
is not pecul::'ar to southern A:rica alone. Adva:lced econo~ies 
like the u.s. one, have a magnetic effect which make the 
country vulnerable to invasion by "environmental refugees". 
For example, the U.S. is currently facing dilem.'!1as in 
distinguishing between political and environmental refugees 
(or economic refugeesi from the neighboring Haiti. See Figure 
s. 
SouLhern Africa in particular faces a potential threat 
from the problem of imbalanced economies, the effects of w.t--.ic:J 
are increasingly becoming a difficult reality to be treated in 
unilatera:;' terns. Complaints about border violations 
lOa 
-:i:". 
problerr.s since they attract poachers throughout the entire 
rf'gion. Since Botswana derives a significant amount of her 
national income [rom the tourist industry, it has become a 
r:atio:lwide concern about the need to protect wildlife and 
other endangered species in the face of scarcity and 
increasing poaching, hence the diversion of the military into 
wildlife protection duties. While this approach remair.s the 
only course available for now, the use of the military in 
overcoming such problems in the future is likely to instill a 
ser,se of insecurity aJ['.ong t~e neighbors. T!1e need for joint 
efforts in managing these diminishing and 
a] :"E:viating poaching becomes more compelling than it was the 
case in the past. 
lr. a similar vein, the South African economy has 
continued, through its gravitational pull, to attract a lot of 
environmental refugees. Since the past decade, population 
migratior. routes are leading into South Africa. 
One disturbing and foreseeable side effect of these 
patterns of mig::::-ation is their like~y ::'mpact especially that 
::hey are ta:::geting a count::::-y whose citizer.ry has been denied 
a wide range cf benefits from in their own land through 
apartheid. The ethnic cleavages which have become so 
e!1trenched in Sou;::h Africa (more than her neighbors) will most 
p~obably be revived once the locals face the challenges for 
limited resou::::-ces. 
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Should the politics of self - interest be allowed to 
overshadow regionalism, then the very ecological dilemmas will 
eventually transform themselves into lively sources of 
conflict, enough to destabilize the entire region. Under such 
circumstances, three different types of conflicts are most 
likely to happen as a result of environmental problems: 1) 
simple scarcity conflicts which we would expect when state 
actors calculate their interests in a zero-sum or negative-sum 
situation such as might arise from resource scarcity, 2) 
group-identity conflicts arising from the large-scale 
movements of populations brought about by environmental 
change, and 3) relative-deprivation conflicts founded on the 
asswnption that as developing societies produce less wealth 
because of environmental problems, their citizens will 
probably become increasingly discontented because of the 
widening gap between their actual level of economic 
achievement and the level they feel they deserve (Homer-Dixon, 
1991, pp.106-9). 
Given the vulnerability of most regional economies to 
the conflicts described above, it is worth stressing the 
importance of a regional approach to environmental problems 
because no country in the region is an exception to the 
widespread ecological changes. South Africa, the regional 
economic giant, has water sources far less than the post-2000 
needs. She will therefore require substantial imports, thus 
creating an obligation to negotiate more equitable downstream 
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user rights with Namibia, Swaziland and Mozambique. 36 
Similarly, South Africa's interests also extend to the energy 
sector in which SADe has a comparative advantage (Chipasula, 
1993, p.159). This is one instance in which ecology will 
foster interaction mechanisms regardless of ideological 
differences or border restrictions. 
Movement across the borders within one region will 
have to be addressed on the basis of consensual checks and 
balances since a wide range of problems are increasingly 
difficult to contain within the borders of one unique nation 
state. Such an approach has become an imperative in southern 
Africa as already evidenced in the observation by Olson & 
Stedman (1993): 
Even the resolution of violent conflict can have 
negative spillover effects on regional security. 
During the ceasefire in Angola in 1992, weapons 
experts noted that the Angolan weapons were being sold 
in South Africa. A sizable cross-border trade in AK-
478 has developed from Mozambique back into South 
Africa, fuelling violence in Natal and the Vaal 
triangle. Such developments show that conflict 
resolution cannot be based solely within nations, but 
must take into account the larger region as a whole 
(p.420) . 
SADC, the current regional resource management platform, 
remains the only vehicle with the capabilities of assisting 
policymakers in manoeuvering within the entire region without 
fears of being accused of promoting sovereign interests 
See Africa ContemporaIT Record(1989). 
lustead of concerted regional effor::.s. 
6. Military Security 
Perhaps the most important aspect of cohes~on in the 
:!"lew southern Afr':can environmen': is military security. The 
role played by the military has not only been costly in the 
:CJ.ce of threats from the Pretoria regime but has also become 
0.1'. i nseparab::'e source of broad policy decisions aimed at 
bringing about peace and security in the ent'.re region. 
According Olson and Stedman, (1993}, in assessiag the past and 
:ut-clr-? role of military secur'.ty in the regioll, pollcymakers 
must: nec~'ssari::'y acknowledge the following reality: 
The ensuing security di::'ernrna and its underlying costs will be 
aggravated across the :c:egion if the situation continues as one 
in which there is no :ramework wj thin whi or. to c:;.ddress the 
force levels. In a sim::'lar vein, the region has now co:ne to 
contrib\~tc troops towards U.N. peacekeeping operat~ons without 
dny specific guidelines govferning the l","vels and nature of 
input_so Giver:: the possibility of increased OperaCluns In 
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tut-Jre (not only wi':hin the region itself) concerted efforts 
are needed to redress these imbalances and integrate the 
diverse efforts towards a common goal, measures which could 
eventually contribute remarkably towards reducing unnecessary 
overhead expendi ture. 
F. TOWARD A BROAD UNDERSTANDING OF SECURITY 
The diversity and interrelatedness of problems in the 
post_-Cold War era are such that the past interpretations of 
the concept of security are narrowly defined and therefore 
libcly to be prejudicial to the study and management of peace 
:'-n future. According to Nathan (1993), in the past, the 
con cepe of security was interpreted by statesmen as follows; 
7he new thinking which is ir..creasingly making its i:npact felt 
has the advantage of being less militaristic and state-
ce:1tric, viewing "security" as a !-J.olistic phenomenon which is 
::::estricted to military matters but broadened Lo 
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incorpora t e political, social and environmental issues. 37 
This approach should not only be restricted to nation states 
but. shou l d be extended to regional and globa l levels. 
The advantages of such an encompassing approach to 
problems which are not unique to any particular nat.ion state, 
but are diverse, far - reaching and cannot be exhausted ; 
1.. Reducing the possibility of armed confl ict fuelled by the 
"securit.y dilemma". 
2. Encouraging the transparency of military institutions 
between neighbors and further inducing an atmosphere 
conducive to complimen tary interactions. 
3. Opening more channels in which senior military officials 
exchange ideas with their civilian counterparts in order 
to seek cost-effective methods of utilizing the 
diminishing resources. 
4. Reorienting the training of military forces and making 
them adaptable to the prevailing set o f conditions within 
t.he entire globe (e .g guidelines of peacekeeping 
operations), for use at regional and international 
levels. 
5 . Creating an obligation towards a holistic (or 
multidisciplinary) approach to security, and awareness 
among policymakers from a wide range of decision-making 
fora, especially where ne ighbors are (intentionally or 
not) engaged in interstate exchanges. 
6. A muc h clearer approach to resource capabilities, 
establishing ground rul es for potential utility will 
necessarily be realized for the benefit of a l l. For 
logical reasons , in a multiparty negotiations, the 
parties themselves will incur costs unless they are being 
conducted under agency auspices (Gray, 1.989, p.?3). 
37. For details, see Nathan (1.993). Additional studies 
elaborating on t.he broadened concept of sec·.lrity and relating 
t.he importance of environmental factors with particular 
emphasis on t heir potential to act as future sources of 
c onflict a re Ulman (1983). Homer-Dixon (1991) and Obasanja 
(1.993) . 
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Perhaps one of the most important historical episodes 
which is an indicator of problems likely to emanate from 
environmental questions in as far as they impinge upon the 
security of all mankind is the difficulty experienced in 
ratifying the "Law of the Sea." Self-interest and diverse 
claims make it difficult for statesmen to compromise and 
address the problem in a different fashion other than the 
zero-sum type of approach. In the meantime, the importance of 
ocean resources in as far as being looked upon as potential 
sources of national wealth has become an overriding concern. 
only the broadened concept of security management under 
the auspices of collective efforts is capable of relating the 
potential future threat scenarios to the present set of 
circumstances and provide a sense of direction as to the 
feasible actions needed for conflict prevention. The initial 
building block has been established in Africa during the early 
years of this decade during the Kampala Conference: 
In May 1991 over 500 participants from Africa and 
other parts of the world met in Kampala, uganda, to 
deliberate on the issue of security, stability, 
development, and cooperation in Africa. This was the 
Conference on Security, Stability, Development and 
cooperation in Africa (CSSDAj process modeled on the 
Helsinki process, but with African realism. The 
resultant Kampala Document stipulated that peace, 
security, and stability are interrelated; further they 
are the preconditions and the basis for development 
and cooperation in Africa. The security, stability, 
and development of African states are inseparably 
interlinked; the erosion of security and stability is 
a major cause of the continuing crises and a main 
impediment to economic growth and human development on 
the continent (Obasanjo, 1993, p.202). 
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The necessary steps to be taken in the southern Africa context 
sh01..<ld be geared ':owards relating the recoIT1F.lcndations 
contained in the Kampala DocJ1Tlent and manipulating them to 
8uit the reg:'..onal circumstances. With the foreseeable trends 
8E interaction and the evolving pe:::-ceptions of secu:::-ity, SADe 
must diversify its resource management ::0 encompass other 
security reldted aspects. It i8 almost impossible to ad8pt an 
approach w~'1ich harmonizes tr.e utilization of resources without 
acknowledging :::heir relationship witr. future conflict. The 
hcighteniI:g concern about increasing military budgetary '::rercds 
cannot be reversed t.:.nless a truly broad understanding of the 
nction of secur:'..::y is ep.couraged. 
'rhe nature of Southern Africa gea-pol i.tics makes 
reg::'onalism an ::'mportant security management alternat:'..ve. ':'he 
i.nterstat_e excr.anges founded on the proximity and cultural 
tacLors disr:ussed so far present a strong case for 
regionalism. ':hth the new set of regional challenges, it seems 
il mu:t.ilateral approach ;:;0 security managemen:: :'0 the 
subcon::inent_ will become a:1 increasil'.g phe:1omenon. 
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VIII. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY POLICY IN BOTSWANA 
Despite the recent transition to democracy in South 
Africa, certain factors about Botswana retrain unal::ered. The 
fundamer.tal factor which has played a crucial role ir. 
determining Botswana's policy choices in the past, ::he geo-
strategic positi.on, ',11 continue to have a profound impact on 
inter:l.al securi ty ar Lairs. Presumably, the country stands to 
gain in a nwnber of security-related spheres as South Africa 
changes. On the same note, Botswana will continue to suffer 
froll'. spill-over problems deriving from her location. 
"Cognizance must also be taken to the fact that political 
change and transition is seldom unaccompanied by instability 
and political violence (du plessis & Hough, 1992, p.123). 
with South Africa having recently joined the non-aligned 
movement, OAU and looking forward to being inaugurated as the 
eleventh -mer of SADe, the political gap which historically 
existed b("c,..reen the goverIL"l1ent of Botswana and other regional 
members on the one hand, and the South African white-minority 
gap is being closed. The far-reaching i:nplicatian of this 
change is that it is going to be difficu::.t for Botswana to 
treat maLters prejudicial to the maintenance of peace and 
stability in South Africa as being purely outside her own 
jurisdiction. For her sur-rival, Botswana will nost probably 
face the difficulty cf becoming an active participan<: in the 
complicated but rewarding process of reversir.g the s::ructurill 
inequalilies of apartl,eid in SO'Jth Africa. 
DISMANTLING APARTHEID 
AftEer tbree hundred DOO) years of apartheid rule in Sou::h 
A[~ica. t_ne new government of national unity faces t:he 
difficul:: and multifa\:F':-_ed task of creating a true pluralistic 
demcc.racy in which the benefits are shared equally. Owing to 
t.he politics of separate development (apartheid), the African 
population was relegated to the least desirable position when 
SOCidl amenities were distributed, consequently it: has 
:;;uffered in the following key areas: employrnent opportunities, 
health care, food security, education, judicial treatment ilcd 
other societal departments. For example, the Bantu education, 
tailored specifically the Afr::'can population, did Clot receive 
equal goverrJllental attention and funding ccmpared to its 
"superior" CCIl::lterpart, education for the white popula::ion. 
The resu1 t ~as been a :lOticeable trend in which the rates of 
illiteracy among :;he Atrican population were increas~ng. 
Notwithstanding the :neasures a!:ticulated in t:le program of 
action of lhe new gcverrL!lent, tf1.ere remains dilemmas inherent 
red.C<;'Rsir::g these imbalances: 1) where and how to start 
giver:: the fact that L"18Se problems were not uniform and 
respcr:.se to the l:'mited offers fr::.m the National:'st Party were 
utilized in varying degrees. and the ov('rClll response of 
the citizenry, weighir..g the actual governmental measures 
v.gv.i:1st the expected. Related to the second dilemma is the 
:act that these IT'.easure are being implemented in a fragile and 
ctanging environment which is still rooted in a society with 
etl":nic clev.vages, hence the intriguing ques':ion of the 
possibil:"ty of a civil war or any fonn of turbulence 
associated with Lhe transition period. 
A s":rategy which emphasizes the welfare of the Lmg 
oppressed "minority groups" is inherently controversiaJ 
:::hat it: calls to qc;estion the nature of democracy and t...e 
principle of equality in the eyes of the fanner beneficiaries 
fro:'1l the apar.theid system. On the same note, a strategy which 
leans mere towards "equitable distribution" of amenities 
all citizens without due regard to history is likely 
generate dissatisfaction among the former victims of 
apartheid. 
The complexity inherent in this process lies in the 
ability to integrate the diverse and historically conflicting 
"publics" within South Africa. To overcone these dilemmas, the 
orientation within the country should deveJJ") such that tr.e 
diverse groups become a single and unified s,",ciety in which 
ethr.icity questions are downplayed for the sake of progcess, 
otherwise the process of harmonizing efforts will lend itself 
to one in which the economy ot '.::he country is placed in 
jeopardy, a scena"!:"io which is I'.ot in the best interest of 
South Africa v.nd her neighbors whose cr.ances of economic 
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survival are limited. The participation of the neighboring 
states is la:::-gely due to the fact that South Africa is now and 
will continue to be the economic colossus of the region (Boyd, 
1993, p.151). In this regard, the strategic and corporate 
interests of Botswana compel her (and other regional states) 
to be sensitive to any moves within South Africa likely to 
endanger peace and stability_ 
REINVENTING THE SADF 
One of the most important and pertinent questions vita l to 
Bo tswana's survival with respec t to her proximity to South 
Africa revolves around the ability of the former to reinvent 
her military. The necessity is further prompted by 
circumstances germane to political change . Unlike JTlany 
military institutions across the world which are strengthened 
to counter external threats, the SADF was developed to its 
current levels largely for foiling the internal struggle. The 
victimization of the regional neighbors through the grand 
strategies, the total strategy and total onslaught, were not 
as important as the internal role of the armed forces. Within 
and across the borders of South Africa, the SADF has a 
his torical stigma of being an instrument of oppression. It has 
been d ifficult t o draw proper lines of distinction between the 
military and its sister department, the police forces. The two 
have beer. used on an a l ternative basis for "law enforcement" 
tasks . 
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Now that the old internal threat has faded away, the new 
government must necessarily make choices regarding what has to 
be upheld for continuity purposes. Consistent with the altered 
environment are the changing threat perceptions which create 
additional pressure for redefining the roles and missions of 
the armed forces. In the post-Cold War environment in which 
clear and distinct global threats are yet to be determined, it 
seems South Africa will have to commit her armed forces 
towards patrolling the Atlantic and Indian Oceans because of 
their increasing strategic significance, shifting the focus 
from inside. Apart from the crucial question of depoliticizing 
the SADF, broad defense policy considerations within South 
Africa must focus on the following processes: 1) redefining 
the roles and missions Of different services, 2) 
restructuring, downsizing and integration of armed forces, 
the former homelands armies (part of the SADF military 
machinery) must be dissolved for purposes of a single a 
unified national army, and 3) building the notion of 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry through the goal of 
improving civil-military relations. 38 Apart from reducing the 
large share allocated the military and further reversing the 
opportunity cost associated with defense spending, the 
structural changes have some far-reaching implications for 
38. For a detailed discussion of the measures to be taken 
in the broad process of reinventing the SADF, see Williams 
(1993) . 
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Botswana (as a regional microcosm) in terms of broad policy 
choices . 
While the rebuilding of the SADF has been or:!e of the 
critical policy initia t ives cherished by Botswana, it does not 
ser i ously alter matters relating to military security. Perhaps 
~he most .important ar:!d favorable changes are in the area of 
lessening the notion of "security dilemma". For a lang ti.me, 
military security in Botswana was addressed within the 
parameters of threats posed by South Africa and can only be 
altered the basis of the latter implementing necessary 
changes in ~he military arena and creating a stable. One 
further manifestation of rest:::-ucturing anned farces is the 
likelihood of reducing escalating defense expenditure. For as 
long as South Africa retains her present preponderant 
capabilities, diversion of resources from the military wi thin 
Botswana remains less feasible. 
On the ather hand , the elaborate process of reinventing 
the military in South Africa does not imply that Botswana 
should alc.er significantly the roles and missions of the armed 
forces. name l y, counter- insurgency and counter -penetration. 
Again, the geo-strategic l ocation of Botswana vis-a-vis the 
gravi t ational pull of the South Afr i can economy r enders the 
country a stepping ground into South Africa. As migration 
problems deepen, South Africa is likely to intenSify patrols 
to curtail illegal crossings into her borders. This move will 
leave Botswana as an accumulation point for parties migrating 
fron the r.orthern part of the continent drifting southwards, 
thus creating further security p:::-oblems. Given these 
crallenges, Botswana can only reduce the magnitude of her past 
military rClles if ~er neighbors are w::'11ing to be eq'.lally 
involved in t~ese regional dilemmas throug~ concerted efforts 
and dialogue, o~herwise, a complete change will most 
probdbly place t~e country in jeopardy, 
C. REGIONALISM OR NATIONALISM? 
In the past Botswana played a cr"(;.cial role in the 
elaborate process of integrating her regional neighbors, ':'he 
strategic reasoning behind such a strong commitment towards 
the usefulness of regionalism in addressing a wide range of 
problems remains vital to Botswana's interests, With the 
rapidly diversifying regional security concerns, the need to 
promote a sense of unity among neighbor3 will most probably 
beccme an indispensab:e measure for Botswana to survive, 
Given t_he vulnerability of Botswana to various external 
forces, there are serious limits to which the country can 
at;:empt tD adopt a nationalistic policy in dealing with 
matters which ~ave serious ramifications for regional 
stability. ~ationa:istic approaches should continue being 
evall<ated against their likely impact on the tempo 0= regional 
and internatiollal pCllitics prevailing at a givell time. As a 
product cf concerted intereational eEforts, Botswana has the 
obligation o~ continuing play a pivotal role in 
ll6 
accomplishing goals whicr. will create cohesion among her 
neighbors. T~e essence of such a role is further enhanced by 
the [act ~hat t:.l1e long awaited South African transition L_O 
derocrar:y has oper:ed paths tor regionalism to be pract_iced for 
the benefit of all. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Given the past difficulties under which Botswana found 
herself as a result of her geo-strategic location, it 
the IT.eaSt.;res adopted by the government in maximiziDg influence 
in the region will still remain applicable in futt.;re. 
Botswana's security functions in a vol atile securiLy cantex'.:: 
1:-1 whicr. proximity related faccors play a crucial role. 
Located rigr.t at the center of the subconti:1ent, the coc:ntry 
faces the inescapable obligation to conLinue contributing 
remarkably towards regional amalgamation. The use of military 
security w11~ I however I re!\1ain subservient to diplomacy. The 
incentives for regionalism discussed so far can enhance the 
sec"-lrity 8f Botswana considerably. This is largely due to the 
fact that the country's geo-strategic location has worked its 
disadvantage 1:1 the past and will remain one of the crucial 
de~erminar.ts of foreign policy. 
The increasing pressures for domestic developments across 
the region ca~l f8r concerted efforts in rr.anaging security 
i. e. adopting an approach based on the broadened concept of 
security in which regional neighbors will most probably assist 
each other. Such an approach is becoming increasingly 
desirable as regional states are perpetually confronted by 
socio-economlC, military, poli::.ical and environmental 
probler:ls. 
ll8 
The need to divert resources from defense spending into 
various domestic projects in southern Africa must necessarily 
be a collective effort which can only be achieved through an 
open dialogue regarding military institutions in the region. 
Failure to do so will most probably call to question the 
efforts towards economic and political stability in the 
region. 
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